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LIABILITY FOR UNREASONABLY AND UNAVOIDABLY 
UNSAFE PRODUCTS: DOES NEGLIGENCE 
DOCTRINE HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY? 
JosEPH A. PAGE* 
INTRODUCIION 
To what extent, if any, should courts hold defendants liable for 
harm caused by hazards associated with the unduly and unavoidably 
dangerous aspects of goods they produce and market? 
Where manufacturers might have eliminated unreasonable risks 
arising from the manufacture or design of a product, or from the infor-
mation (or lack thereof) conveyed by a product's labeling, the tort 
system traditionally has provided injured victims with an opportunity 
to obtain compensation for injuries attributable to these risks.1 More-
over, even where risks from manufacturing or construction defects 
could not have been eliminated with the exercise of reasonable care, 
the courts have permitted plaintiffs to recover under a theory of strict 
tort liability.z 
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1. See generally 1 M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABIUTY §§ 4.1-4.13 (2d ed. 1988) 
(negligence as basis for manufacturers' liability); MARSHALLS. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS 
UABIUTY lj['j[ 5.01-5.09 (1987) (same). 
Unreasonable risks have been defined as dangers that outweigh the utility of the conduct 
that creates them. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 291 (1977). Thus, due care would 
require the taking of precautions that would have cost less than the foreseeable accident costs. 
See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32 (1972) (cost of precau-
tions measured by expense of making activity safer or benefit foregone by eliminating or cur-
tailing activity). 
2. See MADDEN, supra note 1, § 9.6. 
Although most courts also hold manufacturers strictly liable in tort for defective design and 
for inadequate warnings or instructions for use, some commentators have argued that plaintiffs 
burden in sucP .:ases is often either identical or very close to the burden she would have to meet 
in order to es, ... blish negligence. See Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: 
From Negligence {to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593, 645 
(1980); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. 1\verski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: 
The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265, 271-78 (1990); see also David G. 
Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the "Strict" Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. 
87 
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But suppose no warning or change in design could have made the 
product reasonably safe, and the only way the risk in question could 
have been eliminated was by keeping the product out of the stream of 
commerce. 3 In such cases, the dangers to be avoided were inherent in 
REv. 743; William C. Powers, Jr., The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TEx. L. REv. 
777, 777-78 (1983}. 
The major distinction said to separate strict liability from negligence in design cases is that 
in the latter plaintiff must establish that defendant knew or should have known of the risk that 
ought to have been eliminated by an alternative design, while in strict liability knowledge of risks 
is imputed to manufacturers. See Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard 
of Responsibility, 39 WAYNE L. REv. 1217,1244-45 (1993); Keith Miller, Design Defect Litigation 
in Iowa: The Myths of Strict Liability, 40 DRAKE L. REv. 465, 484-86 (1991); Gerald F. Tietz, 
Strict Products Liability, Design Defects and Corporate Decision-Making: Greater Deterrence 
Through Stricter Process, 38 VILL. L. REv. 1361, 1423-30 (1993). 
However, the proposition that manufacturers may be liable for failing to design out un-
knowable risks is generally found in dictum. See, for example, Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 
386 A.2d 816, 825 (N.J. 1978), stating: 
[I]n design defect liability analysis the ... criterion of 'unreasonably dangerous' is an 
appropriate one if understood to render the liability of the manufacturer substantially 
coordinate with liability on negligence principles. The only qualification is as to the 
requisite of foreseeability by the manufacturer of the dangerous propensity of the chat-
tel manifested at the trial-this being imputed to the manufacturer. 
Another example can be seen in Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1037 (Or. 1974), 
stating: 
The question of whether the design is unreasonably dangerous can be determined only 
by taking into consideration the surrounding circumstances and knowledge at the time 
the article was sold, and determining therefrom whether a reasonably prudent manu-
facturer would have so designed and sold the article in question had he known of the 
risk involved which injured plaintiff. 
In the area of warnings, there are a handful of decisions holding that defendant might be 
liable for failing to warn of unknowable risks. See, e.g., Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273 
(Mass. 1984); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 547-549 (N.J. 1982). How-
ever, most courts require plaintiffs in strict liability cases to prove that defendant knew or should 
have known of the risk. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 99, at 697 (5th ed. 1984). 
For other examples of holdings that impose upon plaintiffs in strict liability design and warn-
ings cases a lesser burden than that which they would have to bear in negligence cases, see 
Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443,457-558 (Cal. 1978) (burden placed on defendant to show 
that utility of product as designed outweighed risks); see also Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiber-
glas Corp., 810 P.2d 549,559 (Cal. 1991) (dictum that in strict liability warnings cases plaintiff not 
required to show that defendant's failure to warn of known or knowable risk was unreasonable). 
Some jurisdictions permit plaintiffs to recover in strict tort upon proof that the design of the 
product did not satisfy the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer, a test that might 
impose strict liability upon some nonnegligent manufacturers. See, e.g., Vmcer v. Esther Wil-
liams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 230 N.W.2d 794, 798 (Wis. 1975). For a sympathetic 
discussion of the consumer-expectations test, see F. Patrick Hubbard, Reasonable Human Ex-
pectations: A Normative Model for Imposing Strict Liability for Defective Products, 29 MERCER 
L. REv. 465 (1978); Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doc-
trine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109 (1974). 
For an exhaustive survey of state law on design-defect liability, see John F. Vargo, The 
Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a "New Cloth" for Section 402A 
Products Liability Design Defects-A Survey of the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. 
L. REV. 493 (1996). 
3. An inherently dangerous product might be reasonably safe in the proper hands. Courts 
have imposed a duty on sellers to use due care in distributing products that might foreseeably 
cause harm if certain classes of people consumed or used them. See MADDEN, supra note 1, 
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the nature of the product. Eliminating these dangers would have ne-
cessitated a decision not to have manufactured the product in the first 
place. 
Whether liability should be imposed for unavoidable product 
risks has been an issue at the core of a spirited polemic, during the last 
decade-and-a-half, about how courts should respond to suits seeking 
to hold the makers of handguns liable in tort to plaintiffs shot by crim-
inal assailants using these weapons.4 
Professors Twerski and Henderson have responded to this debate 
and to scattered decisions imposing per se liability on manufacturers 
of unavoidably dangerous products other than handguns.5 They have 
argued that manufacturers should not be legally responsible for selling 
products posing either generally known or adequately warned against 
risks, if at the time of marketing there was no economically and tech-
nologically feasible alternative design that might have eliminated 
those risks without changing the essential nature of the product.6 
§ 3.17 (liability of retailers for sale of dangerous products to minors under theory of negligent 
entrustment). At least one court has extended this duty to manufacturers. See Moning v. Al-
fano, 254 N.W.2d 759, 762 (Mich. 1977) (manufacturer might be liable in negligence for the 
marketing of slingshots to children). For an argument that manufacturers of handguns should 
have a duty to use reasonable care to facilitate the control of the distribution of their products to 
make sure they do not fall into irresponsible hands, see STUART M. SPEISER, LAwsurr 369-72 
(1980). For a recent article advocating the use of a theory of negligent marketing and promotion 
against manufacturers of handguns, see Andrew Jay McClurg, The Tortious Marketing of Hand-
guns: Strict Liability Is Dead, Long Live Negligence, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 777 (1995). 
Manufacturers have a duty of due care to design out dangers that might arise from a prod-
uct's foreseeable misuses. See MADDEN, supra note 1, § 8.4. They may also be liable for failing 
to warn of dangers from the foreseeable misuse of a product. See id. § 10.6. 
4. See, e.g., Andrew J. McClurg, Handguns As Products Unreasonably Dangerous Per Se, 
13 U. ARK. LITTLE RocK L.J. 599, 600-603 (1991); Philip D. Oliver, Rejecting the "Whipping-
Boy" Approach to Ton Law: Well-Made Handguns Are Not Defective Products, 14 U. ARK. 
LITTLE RocK L.J. 1 (1991); Andrew J. McClurg, Strict Liability for Handgun Manufacturers: A 
Reply to Professor Oliver, 14 U. ARK. LITTLE RocK L.J. 511, 511-524 (1992); see also Carl T. 
Bogus, Pistols, Politics and Products Liability, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 1103 (1991) (arguing that 
handgun manufacturers should be strictly liable in tort to victims); Donald E. Santarelli & 
Nicholas E. Calio, Turning the Gun on Tort Law: Aiming at Courts to Take Products Liability to 
the Limit, 14 ST. MARY's L.J. 471 (1983) (opposing strict liability); Paul R. Bonney, Note, Manu-
facturers' Strict Liability for Handgun Injuries: An Economic Analysis, 73 GEo. L.J. 1437 (1985) 
(favoring strict liability); Note, Handguns and Products Liability, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1912 (1984) 
(opposing strict liability). 
5. See Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986) (asbestos); 
O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983) (above-ground swimming pool with vinyl-
covered bottom); see also Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1328 n.5 (Or. 1978) 
(dictum that jury might find a manufacturer was unreasonable in marketing a highly and un-
avoidably unsafe product). 
6. See James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability 
Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1263 (1991); see also Har-
vey M. Grossman, Categorical Liability: Why the Gates Should Be Kept Closed, 36 S. TEx. L. 
REv. 385 (1995) (advocating similar position). 
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Henderson and Twerski detailed the case against what they 
termed product-category liability,? a theory that would permit plain-
tiffs to hold manufacturers or sellers responsible for harm resulting 
from the decision to market inherently dangerous products. They first 
took aim at across-the-board liability for any harm caused by risky, 
nondefective products,8 and then defended the position that per se 
liability should not extend even to unavoidably hazardous products 
whose dangers were found to outweigh their social benefits.9 
Moreover, they have sought to incorporate their view into the 
new Restatement of Products Liability, for which they are serving as 
Reporters.1° The black-letter provisions of the draft would seem to 
exclude the possibility of product-category liability.11 However, a 
comment concedes that there might arise extreme situations, such as 
where defendant manufactures exploding cigars meant to blow up in 
the faces of practical jokers' unsuspecting victims, in which courts 
might impose liability for marketing products with a high degree of 
risk and a low degree of social utility.12 
7. The term "generic product risk" has been suggested as an alternative for the type of 
hazards that might give rise to product-category liability. See Carl T. Bogus, War on the Com-
mon Law: The Struggle at the Center of Products Liability, 60 Mo. L. REv. 1, 30 (1995). Product-
category risks are unavoidable dangers that are common to an entire class of products, but ge-
neric risks may also arise from product-design features that might be altered in a way that would 
eliminate the unreasonableness of the hazard without changing the essence of the product. 
Hence, it may perhaps be more accurate to treat product-category risks as a subset of generic 
product risks. See Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment k and for 
Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 853, 857 (1983). 
8. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 6, at 1276-97. 
9. See id. at 1297-1314. 
10. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCI"S LIABILITY 40 (Proposed Final Draft, 
(Preliminary Version) 1996): 
[C]ourts have not imposed liability for categories of products that are generally avail-
able and widely used and consumed, solely on the ground that some persons consider 
those product categories socially undesirable. Instead, courts have concluded that the 
issue is better suited to resolution by legislatures and administrative agencies that can 
more appropriately consider whether distribution of some categories of widely used 
and consumed products should be controlled or even prohibited altogether. 
11. For instance, the liability of commercial sellers is limited, by the Restatement, to harms 
caused by defects in manufacture, design, warnings or instructions for use. See id. § 1. Manufac-
turing defects arise when the "product departs from its intended design." /d. § 2(a). A design is 
defective if the foreseeable risks of harm it creates "could have been reduced ... by the adoption 
of a reasonable alternative design." !d. § 2(b). Hence, under the new Restatement, unavoidably 
unsafe products cannot be defective, and hence cannot subject their manufacturers to liability. 
12. See id. § 2 crnt. d & illus. 5. For a criticism of the comment, see Michael J. Toke, Note, 
Categorical Liability for Manifestly Unreasonable Designs: Why the Comment d Caveat Should 
Be Removed from the Restatement (Third), 81 CoRN. L. REv. 1181 (1996). For a discussion of 
the evolution of the Restatement's position on product-category liability, see Ellen Wertheimer, 
The Smoke Gets in Their Eyes: Product Category Liability and Alternative Feasible Designs in the 
Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1429, 1434-40 (1994). 
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Supporters of product-category liability, on the other hand, insist 
on the principle that manufacturers should be accountable for any un-
reasonable decision to place a product line on the market.13 More-
over, they would not apply the rule as a grudging exception invoked 
only in extreme situations. Rather it would apply to any suit-even 
one involving widely available products like cigarettes-where plain-
tiffs claim that the risks generated by the products in question are con-
siderable and their social utility minimaJ.14 
The debate over per se liability has tended to focus on either con-
troversial consumer products such as cigarettes and handguns, or spe-
cialty items of very limited distribution, such as exploding cigars. 
However, there are other types of products that might conceivably 
give rise to product-category claims, such as automatic weapons man-
ufactured for sale to the general public,1s dangerous children's toys,t6 
hazardous prescription drugs and medical devices, 17 and risky foods 
like herbal products.ts 
13. For defenses of product-category liability, see Bogus, supra note 7; Marc Z. Edell, Risk 
Utility Analysis of Unavoidably Unsafe Products, 17 SETON HALL L. REv. 623 (1987); Marshall 
S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALI Restatement Project, 48 V AND. L. 
REv. 631, 671-75 (1995); Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability, 
Section 2(b): Design Defect, 68 TEMPLE L. REv. 167, 193-95 {1995); Wertheimer, supra note 12. 
For a more measured and limited approval of product-category liability, see David G. Owen, 
The Graying of Products Liability Law: Paths Taken and Untaken in the New Restatement, 61 
TENN. L. REv. 1241, 1253-57 (1994). 
14. See Wertheimer, supra note 12, at 1440. 
15. See Wade Lambert, Judge Allows Suit Against Gun Maker In 1993 Slaying, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 11, 1995, at B4 (California Superior Court judge refused to dismiss claim by victims against 
manufacturer of semi-automatic assault pistol used in a shooting rampage). 
16. See EDWARD M. SwAR'IZ, ToYs THAT DoN'T CARE 201-51 (1971) (description of toys 
alleged to have caused serious injury to or death of children). 
17. Dangerous drugs and medical devices cannot be marketed without prior approval by 
the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"). See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 355, 360e {1996). The distribu-
tion of an unreasonably dangerous unapproved new drug or medical device, or the sale of an 
unreasonably dangerous new drug or device mistakenly approved by the FDA, might cause harm 
to a consumer. On the possibility of FDA errors in the approval of new drugs, see Richard A. 
Merrill, Compensation for Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 VA. L. REv. 1, 16 (1973). In addition, 
Congress could at any time enact legislation depriving the FDA of its authority to license new 
drugs and medical devices. The sale of a drug or device that reached the market because of a 
careless judgment by FDA employees, or after Congress repealed or substantially weakened the 
requirement of pre-market approval by FDA, could result in harm to consumers. In either 
event, a product-category suit might be filed on the ground that the foreseeable risks of the drug 
or device outweighed its likely utility. 
18. See Sharon Waxman, Lawsuits Blame Women's Deaths on Unregulated Herbal Products, 
WAsH. PosT, March 24, 1996, at A1, reporting that product-liability suits had been filed alleging 
that fatal cardiac arrhythmias resulted from the consumption of herbal tea. See also Marian 
Burros & Sarah Jay, Concern Grows Over Herb That Promises a Legal High, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
10, 1996, at C1, reporting on fatal strokes and heart attacks suffered by consumers of a Chinese 
herb legally promoted as producing euphoria and heightened sexual sensations. If no warning 
would have been sufficient to provide reasonable protection against the risks associated with 
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This illustrative list suggests the possibility of further distinctions, 
such as a distinction between inherently dangerous products that harm 
consumers or users aware of the risk and those that primarily victim-
ize innocent third parties; and another distinction between consumers 
or users who comprehend the danger and those who do not. The ar-
gument over whether the manufacturers of unreasonably and un-
avoidably dangerous products should be liable in tort to plaintiffs 
harmed by their products up to now generally has ignored these 
distinctions.19 
The debate over per se liability has also for the most part pro-
ceeded on the assumption that the appropriate legal theory in such 
cases lies in strict tort as it has evolved in the area of products liabil-
ity.20 Additionally, some advocates of per se liability have urged the 
courts to utilize the strict tort theory, which imposes liability. upon 
those who engage in abnormally dangerous activities,Z1 or a theory 
that has been termed ultra-strict or absolute liability, an approach that 
would hold defendants liable for any and all harm caused by the 
product.22 
The supporters and opponents of product-category liability have 
locked horns thus far on two discrete levels. First, as a matter of 
sound policy, should manufacturers of unavoidably and unreasonably 
dangerous products be liable at all for harm caused by the risks that 
make these goods unduly hazardous, no matter which theory of strict 
liability plaintiffs utilize? Second, are there any compelling reasons 
why the various strict tort theories do not support the imposition of 
this kind of liability? 
these products and the manufacturers knew or should have known of the danger, claims against 
these manufacturers would be product-category claims. 
19. For an argument supporting a limited strict liability rule, which would permit only by-
standers to recover for harm caused by hazardous products used primarily for enjoyment, see 
Robert F. Cochran, Jr., "Good Whiskey," Drunk Driving, and Innocent Bystanders: The Respon-
sibility of Manufacturers of Alcohol and Other Dangerous Hedonic Products for Bystander In-
jury, 45 S.C. L. REV. 269, 271 (1994). 
20. See, e.g., Bogus, supra note 7, at 30; Henderson & 1\verski, supra note 6, at 1297; Wert-
heimer, supra note 12. 
21. See Andrew 0. Smith, Comment, The Manufacture and Distribution of Handguns as an 
Abnormally Dangerous Activity, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 369 (1987); Rick L. Jeff, Note, Do Victims of 
Unlawful Handgun Violence Have a Remedy Against Handgun Manufacturers: An Overview and 
Analysis, 1985 U. ILL L. REv. 967, 986-94. 
22. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for 
Enterprise Liability, 91 MicH. L. REv. 683 (1993); Note, Absolute Liability for Ammunition Man-
ufacturers, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1679 (1995). For advocacy of a "refined strict liability rule" that 
would come close to imposing absolute liability on handgun manufacturers, see Bonney, Note, 
supra note 4, at 1456-57 (manufacturers should be liable for all handgun injuries, including those 
caused by accidental, non-negligent discharges). 
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This Article will attempt to expand the debate by considering the 
extent to which negligence theory may provide a more suitable ap-
proach to product-category liability. It will also suggest that under 
negligence doctrine, the case can more easily and logically be made 
for denying recovery to consumers or users who are fully aware of a 
product's inherent risks, but freely choose to encounter them and 
thereby suffer harm. 
The test advocated by most supporters of strict-tort product-cate-
gory liability would require the balancing of a product's hazards 
against its utility,23 which seems indistinguishable from the test that 
would be used to determine whether a manufacturer acted reasonably 
in marketing a product.24 The sort of absolute liability its advocates 
would apply to makers of dangerous products, such as handgun am-
munition and cigarettes, is merely a consequence that flows from a 
prior determination that the product's risks so far outweigh its utility 
that the manufacturer ought to bear all losses occasioned by them.25 
Hence, both forms of per se liability reflect a strong connotation of 
blameworthiness on the part of the defendant, and negligence theory 
has been the common law's traditional vehicle for the assessment of 
blame. 
Moreover, strict activity liability was designed to cover situations 
in which the choice to engage in the activity was reasonable, and has 
traditionally reserved to negligence theory situations such as those 
presented in product-category cases, where plaintiff claims that a pru-
dent person would not have engaged in specified conduct.26 
If, as this Article will contend, blameworthiness should be the 
linchpin of product-category liability, it is difficult to justify recoveries 
by consumers or users who understand the extent of the dangers 
posed by an inherently risky product and decide to risk them. Inno-
cent third-party victims and users or consumers unaware of or incapa-
23. See, e.g., Bogus, supra note 7, at 30 (product-category liability "occurs when a product 
generically fails a risk-utility test, that is, when a product remains unreasonably dangerous de-
spite the best possible design, construction, and warnings to the consumer."). 
24. The generally accepted formula for determining whether conduct is negligent involves a 
balancing of the utility of the conduct in question against the probability and magnitude of harm 
it might produce. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at 171; see also supra text accompanying 
note 1. 
For an effort to distinguish risk-utility balancing in negligence from risk-utility balancing in 
strict liability, see Barbara Ann White, Risk-Utility Analysis and the Learned Hand Formula: A 
Hand That Helps or a Hand That Hides?, 32 ARiz. L. REv. 77, 102-11 (1990). 
25. See Note, Absolute Liability for Ammunition Manufacturers, supra note 22; see also 
Frank J. Vandall, Reallocating the Costs of Smoking: The Application of Absolute Liability to 
Cigarette Manufacturers, 52 Omo ST. L.J. 405 (1991). 
26. See infra note 80 and accompanying text. 
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ble of appreciating the danger, however, should have a good cause of 
action in negligence for product-category liability. 
Part I will sketch how negligence, strict liability and absolute lia-
bility doctrine might apply in the product-category context. Part II 
will consider the effect, if any, the use of negligence theory might have 
upon the policy debate over the desirability of imposing product-cate-
gory liability. Part III will explore the extent to which the use of negli-
gence theory might enable plaintiffs to counter doctrinal arguments 
that have been raised against the use of strict and absolute liability in 
product-category cases, and to point out the weakness of a no-liability 
rule. 
l. AVAILABLE TORT THEORIES 
An injured person seeking to recover damages for harm inflicted 
by an unavoidably and unreasonably dangerous product may choose 
from among several possible causes of action on the torts menu. The 
most likely are negligence, in its traditional form, and the theory of 
strict liability employed against the makers of defective, unreasonably 
dangerous products. Other possibilities include strict liability for ab-
normally dangerous activities, and absolute liability. 
A. Negligence 
The contemporary law of negligence begins with the general prin-
ciple that whenever a person knows or should know that what she is 
about to do might create an unreasonable risk of harm to another, she 
has a duty to use reasonable care to avoid creating that risk.27 Courts 
have tempered this principle by placing limitations upon the legal ob-
ligations owed by certain classes of defendants.28 The availability of 
27. Leon Green has referred to this principle as the "danger" test. See Leon Green, The 
Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 1014, 1028 (1928). It originally derived 
from a proposition put forward by Brett, M.R., in Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509 (1883): 
[W]henever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard to 
another that every one of ordinary sense who did think would at once recogni[z]e that 
if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to those circum-
stances he would cause danger of injury to the person or property of the other, a duty 
arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger. 
28. The duty element in negligence permits courts, as a matter of law, to curtail the respon-
sibilities owed by classes of defendants to classes of plaintiffs. Notable examples are the limited 
duties owed by possessors of land to various categories of entrants upon the land. See generally 
JosEPH PAGE, THE LAw OF PREMISES LIABILITY §§ 2.1-3.21 (2d. ed. 1988) (duties owed by a 
land possessor to trespassers and licensees). Another example may be found in the limits courts 
have placed on the duty to rescue a stranger in peril. See generally Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., 
Aiding and Altruism· A Mythopsycholegal Analysis, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 439, 446-64 (1994); 
Steven J. Heyman, Foundations of the Duty to Rescue, 41 VAND. L. REv. 673 (1994). 
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affirmative defenses such as contributory or comparative fault29 and 
assumption of risk30 may further circumscribe the scope of liability 
created by negligence doctrine. 
The original Restatement of Torts postulated that the obligation to 
use due care extended not only to conduct undertaken by an actor, 
but also to the choice to engage in the conduct.31 The Restatement 
(Second) of Torts reiterated this principle without alteration.32 A 
comment to this black-letter formulation points out that the unduly 
dangerous nature of consciously undertaken conduct is determined by 
weighing the conduct's utility against its risks.33 
Thus, the decision to do an unreasonably dangerous deed may 
constitute actionable negligence, even though the actor performed it 
with reasonable care under the circumstances. Similarly, if a defend-
ant had an alternative course of conduct that would not carry with it 
an unavoidable, undue risk, the failure to exercise that option might 
constitute negligence.34 If a defendant's choice was between perform-
ing the unduly risky activity or abstaining, the decision to act might 
constitute negligence.35 Likewise, a plaintiff who opts to engage in an 
activity that subjects her to unavoidable and unreasonable danger, 
29. See generally VIcroR E. SCHWARTZ, CoMPARATIVE NEGUGENCE (3d ed. 1994). 
30. See generally 'KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 68. 
31. "A negligent act may be one which involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another 
(a) although it is done with reasonable care, skill, preparation and warning .... " 
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 297 (1934). 
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 297 (1965). 
33. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS§ 297, cmt. b; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 297, cmt. b. 
34. See, e.g., Vigneault v. Dr. Hewson Dental Co., 15 N.E.2d 185 (Mass. 1938) (finding of 
negligence by court where dentist chose a dangerous method of anesthetization despite the avail-
ability of a reasonably safe alternative). 
The existence of a feasible alternative might affect the risk-benefit calculus in that the dan-
ger would be weighed against the cost of the alternative, which would include any loss of social 
utility it would impose, when compared to the option that defendant did in fact exercise. See, 
e.g., Kimbar v. Estis, 135 N.E.2d 708 (N.Y. 1956) (plaintiff claimed operators of summer camp 
were negligent in not floodlighting path, which campers were using at night; court upheld dismis-
sal of complaint; lighting would have unacceptably diminished the utility of exposing boys to 
adventure in wild). 
35. The decision to engage in a noisy construction project, despite knowledge that female 
minks whelping nearby might kill their young because of noise fright, might be considered negli-
gent. See Hamilton v. King County, 79 P.2d 697 (Wash. 1938) .. 
The theory of negligent entrustment, which holds that a defendant may be liable for failing 
to exercise due care in entrusting a dangerous instrumentality to someone incapable of handling 
it without creating unreasonable risks of harm to others, requires courts to pass judgments upon 
decisions to act rather than decisions not to act. See, e.g., Dean v. Johnston, 206 So. 2d 610 (Ala. 
1968) (negligent entrustment of motor vehicle to incompetent driver); KEETON ET AL., supra 
note 2, at 197-203. Thus, the decision to permit a child to fly an airplane might be negligent. 
(For newspaper publicity about a fatal accident taking the life of a seven-year-old girl seeking to 
set a record as a pilot, see Sam Howe Verhovek, Girl, 7, Seeking U.S. Flight Record, Dies in 
Crash, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1996, at Al. Although the girl was not at the controls at the time of 
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rather than refrain from such activity, may be found contributorily 
negligent.36 
Thus, a potential injurer, in order to avoid potential liability for 
negligence, would need to consider both the reasonableness of the ac-
tivity to be undertaken and the reasonableness of the manner in which 
he engages in the conduct in question.37 If it would be unreasonable 
to engage in the activity, the person engaging in it might be liable in 
negligence to persons injured by the risks that made the activity un-
duly dangerous. On the other hand, if it would be reasonable to en-
the crash, if she had been and an innocent bystander had been injured, a negligence suit for 
activity-category liability might have been brought.) 
The decision to drive a car when the actor knows he may be subjected to a sudden incapac-
ity might be negligent. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at 162. 
A radio station's decision to sponsor a contest in which teenage drivers chased a disc jockey 
in response to clues about where to find him and how to qualify for cash prizes might be negli-
gent. See Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975). 
The decision to pull a chair away from behind a person about to sit on it might be negligent. 
See Ghassemieh v. Schafer, 447 A.2d 84 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982) (but plaintiff not permitted to 
proceed under negligence theory because instruction based on negligence not requested). 
36. The doctrine of unreasonable assumption of risk, in most jurisdictions a subcategory of 
contributory or comparative fault, arises when a plaintiff voluntarily chooses to encounter a 
known risk under circumstances where a reasonable person would have opted to do nothing or 
something different. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at 497. 
Thus, the decision to dash onto railroad tracks to save a hat might be considered negligent. 
See id., at 171, citing Eckert v. Long Island R.R., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871), where the court stated 
"[f]or a person engaged in his ordinary affairs, or in the mere protection of property, knowingly 
and voluntarily to place himself in a position where he is apt to receive a serious injury, is negli-
gence .... " Id. at 506; see also Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 291 (Fla. 1977) (dictum that 
it would be negligent for tenant to run into blazing premises to save his favorite fedora). 
37. Professor Steven Shaven, without citing any authority, has asserted that negligence Jaw 
does not impose liability for choices to engage in conduct. 
By definition, under the negligence rule all that an injurer needs to do to avoid the 
possibility of liability is to make sure to exercise due care if he engages in his activity. 
Consequently he will not be motivated to consider the effect on accident losses of his 
choice of whether to engage in his activity or, more generally, of the level at which to 
engage in his activity .... 
Steven Shaven, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1980) (footnote 
omitted). 
In a subsequent book, he conceded that a court might hold a defendant negligent for choos-
ing to engage in an activity if the activity is very risky and involves scant utility to the defendant, 
even though due care is exercised. See STEVEN SHA VELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT 
LAw 26 (1987) (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS § 297 (1977)). Section 297, however, 
says nothing about the necessity to show that the activity in question was very risky, or that it 
involves scant utility. The major point Shaven was seeking to make is that under negligence 
doctrine, in determining whether an actor breached her duty of care, courts consider only the 
way an activity is conducted, and not how often the activity is conducted; hence, negligence 
theory may not deter excessive levels of risky conduct; strict liability, on the other hand, may 
reduce risky activity levels, since the actor will be liable for any harm caused by the activity and 
not only harm caused by the manner in which the activity is conducted. Therefore an actor will 
have an incentive to reduce her activity to an appropriately efficient level. 
For a criticism of this thesis, see Stephen G. Gilles, Rule-based Negligence and the Regula-
tion of Activity Levels, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 319 (1992); see also Latin, Activity Levels, Due Care, 
and Selective Realism in Economic Analysis of Tort Law, 39 RUTGERS L. REv. 487 (1987). 
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gage in the activity, the person engaging in it still might be liable if a 
court adjudged the activity as abnormally dangerous. 38 
The imposition of negligence-based tort liability on the manufac-
turers of unreasonably and unavoidably unsafe products would re-
quire proof that a reasonable person in defendant's position, with the 
knowledge that defendant possessed-or in the exercise of due care 
should have possessed39-would not have marketed the product.40 
Such a decision would be warranted if the foreseeable risks of harm 
from marketing the product would exceed the costs of avoiding that 
harm, which, in the product-liability context, is measured by the loss 
of utility that society incurs from the unavailability of the product.41 
As a result, the fact finder would determine what a prudent manufac-
turer would have decided (and the extent to which a prudent manu-
facturer would have tested), unless the court determined that 
reasonable minds could not differ on the issue.42 
38. See infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text. 
39. A defendant who failed to take reasonable steps to test the product for potential dan-
gers would be charged with the knowledge that such tests would have revealed. On the manu-
facturer's liability for design defects that could have been detected by adequate testing, see 
MADDEN, supra note 1, § 9.8, at 340-41. 
40. Some products might not create unreasonable risks if their distribution were limited. 
Potent medicines sold to the general public might endanger consumers who are unaware of the 
danger or desire to abuse them. However, since distribution controls, in the form of the require-
ment of sale by prescription only, might reduce the risks to a tolerable level, the manufacturer's 
decision to market the goods subject to controls on their distribution might not be unreasonable. 
If the manufacturer knew or could reasonably have foreseen that available distribution controls 
do not prevent ignorant or unauthorized persons from exposure to risks generated by the prod-
uct, this might push the level of risk beyond acceptability. 
41. The Restatement of Torts posits that the most important element of social utility is "the 
value which the Jaw attaches to the interest which the [defendant's] conduct is intended and 
appropriate to advance Or protect." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 292, cmt. a (1977). 
The fact that some risk may be inherent in the manufacture of a product does not make that risk 
unreasonable "because it is believed that the whole community benefits by it." /d. It would then 
seem to follow that if the community on balance suffered detriment from the marketing of the 
product, this disutility would weigh in favor of a determination that it was not reasonable to put 
the product into the stream of commerce. 
Dean William Prosser reiterated the same point, albeit by implication, in discussing the 
potential liability of manufacturers of unavoidably dangerous products such as alcohol and 
pharmaceuticals, when he noted that: 
Where only negligence is in question, the answer as to such products is a simple one. 
The utility and social value of the thing sold clearly outweighs the known, and all the 
more so the unknown risk, and there is no negligence in marketing the product. 
William L. Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 23 {1966). 
Thus, if the known risks associated with a product clearly outweighed the utility and social 
value of the product, it would seem to follow from Prosser's statement that a manufacturer 
would be negligent in marketing the product. 
42. See Moning v. Alfano, 254 N.W.2d 759,771 (Mich. 1977) {dictum that trial court should 
direct verdict for defendant if a plaintiff attempted to impose negligence-based product-category 
liability on an automobile manufacturer, because the utility of transportation by automobile 
overrides the risks created by them.). 
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An unexcused violation of a statute or regulation that makes it 
illegal to market a product may be per se unreasonable, or at the very 
least relevant to the issue of whether the defendant's decision was rea-
sonable.43 Compliance with a licensing statute or regulation, however, 
would not be per se reasonable, but it would be admissible to prove 
the reasonableness of the decision to market the product.44 
The imposition of fault-based liability in product-category cases 
arguably would promote the underlying goals of negligence law. Man-
ufacturers would be deterred from marketing chattels whose foresee-
able risks outweigh their social utility, and hence economic efficiency 
would be promoted.45 The manufacture and distribution of unavoid-
ably dangerous goods whose risks outweigh their social utility might 
offend the community's sense of fairness when those injured by the 
products are unwary consumers or third-party victims who derived no 
specific gain from the consumption or use of the particular product in 
question. 46 
To avoid subjecting marketing decisions to judicial review, a man-
ufacturer might attempt to convince the court to hold that defendant 
had no duty to exercise reasonable care-or had a duty to exercise 
less than reasonable care-in deciding whether to market the product. 
Courts often have used the duty element to narrow general obliga-
tions to employ due care when they have been persuaded that policy 
considerations dictate such a result.47 In what may be viewed as a 
product-category case involving the claim that in the exercise of due 
43. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABIUTY § 7(a) (Proposed Final 
Draft (Preliminary Version) 1996). See also Joseph H. Hallway, Jr., Comment, Products Liability 
Based Upon Violation of Statutory Standards, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1388, 1389 (1966). For a decision 
holding a retailer absolutely liable for harm caused by the sale of glue to minors in violation of a 
state statute, see Zerby v. Warren, 210 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1973). 
44. See RESTATEMENT THIRD OF TORTS: PRoDUCTS LIABIUTY § 7(b) (Proposed Final 
Draft (Preliminary Version) 1996). 
45. For a thoughtful discussion of the deterrence goal of tort law, see Gary T. Schwartz, 
Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter? 42 UCLA L. REv. 
377, 381-87 (1994). 
46. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 4, at 21-23 (discussing the relationship 
between community values and fault-based tort liability). 
According to a prominent law and economics scholar, inefficiency, exemplified by the 
squandering of social wealth that results when harm is inflicted despite the fact that the cost of 
prevention "[is] a cheaper alternative to the accident," arouses the indignation and moral disap-
proval of the community. Posner, supra note 1, at 33. 
For an argument that fault-based liability should protect and promote personal autonomy 
and equality to the extent it can do so without excessive cost, see David G. Owen, The Fault Pit, 
26 GA. L. REv. 703, 719-23 (1992). See also David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products 
Liability Law: Toward First Principles, 68 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 427 (1993) (providing a more 
detailed discussion of moral fault as the basis for product liability). 
47. The California courts have developed the most extensive and sophisticated list of policy 
factors that might bear upon the limitation of legal duties. They include: 
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care defendant should not have marketed a record album that alleg-
edly incited plaintiff's decedent to commit suicide, one court held that 
the right of free speech provided a policy justification for its refusal to 
recognize a duty that might dampen artistic expression.48 
Where duty is an issue, courts have the option to hold that a man-
ufacturer making a marketing decision need not use any care, should 
use ordinary care, or should merely refrain from selling highly risky 
products with little or no utility.49 The recognition of the duty, or the 
refusal to recognize the duty, should apply to all product manufactur-
ers.50 It is conceivable that courts might be tempted to refrain from 
imposing the duty on the makers of highly useful products, on the 
ground that imposition of the obligation might deter socially desirable 
innovation. The proper application of the duty, however, should not 
impede the development of new, highly useful products. The duty of 
due care requires the balancing of utility against risks that were 
known or should have been known, and courts have the authority to 
direct verdicts on the breach-of-duty issue where a marketing decision 
took into account a very high degree of usefulness and/or a very low 
quantum of foreseeable risk. 
Under negligence doctrine, plaintiffs also would have to establish 
that their injuries were in fact caused by the product. 51 In addition, 
the scope of recovery would be limited to harms resulting from those 
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suf-
fered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the 
injury suffered, the moral blame attached to defendant's conduct, the policy of prevent-
ing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the 
community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and 
the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. 
Rowland v. Christian, 443 P. 2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968) (abolishing limited duties owed by land 
possessors to entrants, and imposing general duty of due care). 
48. See McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 197 (1988); see also DeFilippo v. NBC, 
446 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982) (holding that the First Amendment barred suit against NBC for reck-
lessly telecasting a stunt that plaintiffs decedent imitated, with fatal consequences); Walt Disney 
Prod., Inc. v. Shannon, 276 S.E.2d 580, 583 (Ga. 1981) (holding First Amendment barred suit 
against defendant for negligently telecasting an allegedly dangerous method of reproducing 
sound effects, which when child imitated, resulted in injury). 
49. There is precedent at common law for the judicial imposition of less-than-ordinary care 
duties. For example, courts have held that possessors of land owe adult trespassers an obligation 
only to refrain from wilful, wanton or reckless disregard of the latter's safety. See PAGE, supra 
note 28, § 2.3. 
50. If a court were to exempt the manufacturers of some types of goods from product-
category liability, it would be inviting those manufacturers subjected to potential product-cate-
gory liability to mount a constitutional challenge based upon the denial of equal protection. For 
an example of an unsuccessful challenge in the product-liability context, see In re Asbestos Liti-
gation, 829 F.2d 1233, 1244 (3d Cir. 1987) (asbestos producers might be subjected to stricter 
standards of liability than other manufacturers). 
51. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 41, at 263. 
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risks that made the product unreasonably dangerous in the first 
place.52 For instance, in product-category cases involving handguns, 
liability would extend to gunshot wounds caused by the criminal use 
of the weapon, but not to the remote risk of traumatic injury caused if 
the gun fell from a shelf and struck plaintiff.53 
Even though a court might find a marketer to have breached the 
duty of reasonable care and the element of causation satisfied, the 
availability of affirmative defenses might provide the marketer with 
either partial or complete exoneration. Plaintiff's failure to exercise 
reasonable care for his own safety would be a complete bar to recov-
ery in jurisdictions recognizing contributory negligence,54 and would 
reduce plaintiff's recovery in comparative-negligence jurisdictions.55 
Plaintiff's knowledge of the product's inherent danger and her volun-
tary decision to encounter that danger might shield defendant from 
liability in jurisdictions recognizing assumption-of-risk.56 
In situations where the harm was intentionally, recklessly or neg-
ligently inflicted upon an innocent third party by the user of the prod-
uct, a negligent manufacturer would have an action for contribution 
against the user.57 The possibility, however, that the user might be 
judgment-proof, combined with the availability of the doctrine of joint 
52. This result would be obtained if the court utilized a theory, often referred to as the risk 
rule, postulating that "the scope of liability should ordinarily extend to but not beyond the scope 
of the 'foreseeable risks'-that is, the risks by reason of which the actor's conduct is held to be 
negligent." Id. § 42, at 273; see also ROBERT E. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS 
18-20 (1963) (stating the policy of the risk rule as limiting scope of an actor's liability to factors 
that support a finding that actor had acted negligently). 
53. Gunshot wounds intentionally inflicted during the perpetration of criminal activity 
clearly would fit within the scope of the foreseeable risks found to make the decision to market 
handguns unreasonable. But what about other kinds of gunshot injuries, such as harm from 
accidental discharges, harm from the use of the weapon in self-defense (either legally justifiable 
or legally unjustifiable), and even suicide? One approach to the issue is to determine whether 
the likely risks from criminal discharges are sufficient to make marketing the weapons unreason-
able. If so, extending liability to other kinds of foreseeable risks would not change the deter-
rence effect of potential liability for criminal discharges. Hence, there would be no justification 
for holding the manufacturer responsible for harm from foreseeable risks that, considered sepa-
rately, would not be unreasonable. 
54. See 2 M. STUART MADDEN, PRoDucrs LIABIUTY, § 13.4 (2d ed. 1988). 
55. See id. § 13.13. For a persuasive argument that in products cases the only kind of plain-
tiffs conduct that should bear upon comparative negligence is conduct based upon specific 
awareness of a product's hazards, see Mary J. Davis, Individual and Institutional Responsibility: 
A Vision for Comparative Fault in Product Liability, 39 VrLL. L. REv. 281, 348 (1994). 
56. See 2 MADDEN, supra note 54, § 13.5. 
57. On contribution, see generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, §50 (discussing different 
approaches to loss shifting). Some jurisdictions permit contribution on the basis of degrees of 
fault. See id. § 67, at 475-476. Thus, a negligent manufacturer might be able to shift a substantial 
portion of its liability if the product's user or consumer recklessly or intentionally injured a third-
party victim. 
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and several liability, would reduce the manufacturer's chances of shift-
ing responsibility.ss 
B. Strict Products Liability 
The doctrine of strict-tort products liability emerged from section 
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which promulgated the 
black-letter rule holding sellers responsible for harm caused by their 
defective, unreasonably dangerous products.59 Originally applicable 
to food,60 and then to products for "intimate bodily use,"61 this rule, 
rather late in its development, was further stretched by drafters to 
cover all products.62 The rule's comments, drafted mainly with comes-
tibles, drugs and cosmetics in mind, were not rethought and revised to 
address peculiar problems, such as the standard to be used when de-
termining liability in design cases that surfaced when the entire cornu-
copia of consumer products came within the range of strict tort 
products liability.63 
The Restatement (Second) addresses product-category liability in 
a rather peripheral way. The drafters did consider whether the manu-
facturers of cigarettes and alcoholic beverages might be liable for una-
voidable risks posed by their products.64 But the test they adopted for 
determining unreasonable danger focuses upon whether the product 
creates hazards that are beyond the contemplation of the ordinary 
consumer.65 Therefore, where a whole category of products poses 
known, inherent risks, what has come to be known as the "consumer-
58. Under the rule of joint and several liability, the injured plaintiff has the option to collect 
the entire amount of the judgment against the negligent manufacturer. See id. § 47, at 328-30. 
Thus, the latter would be forced to bear the entire amount of liability if the user had no assets 
with which to satisfy the judgment. 
59. § 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User of Consumer: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the 
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby 
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial 
change in the condition in which it is sold .... 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965). 
60. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS§ 402A (Tentative Draft No.6, 1961). 
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 7, 1962). 
62. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 10, 1964). 
63. See Page, supra note 7, at 860. 
64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 1, § 402A cmt. i (1965). 
65. See id. This comment elucidated what was meant by the phrase "unreasonably danger-
ous": "The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contem-
plated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the 
community as to its characteristics." /d. 
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expectation test" seems to preclude recovery under the new strict-tort 
theory.66 
Some commentators argued that strict liability ought to apply 
even when a product posed unknown and unknowable risks, if a rea-
sonable manufacturer, aware of the dangers at the time the product 
was in the developmental stage, would have warned against them or 
opted not to market the product.67 This approach would require the 
use of risk-utility balancing, since a prudent manufacturer presumably 
would withhold a commodity from the market if its dangers out-
weighed the social gains it might produce. 
Resort to a risk-utility test in these kinds of product-category 
cases tracked the development of a similar test for defective, unrea-
sonably dangerous design. Although the Restatement made no men-
tion of such a standard, commentators and courts found it to be a 
workable approach to cases in which the product line in question 
posed a generic hazard that could be eliminated by the adoption of an 
alternative design.68 Some jurisdictions permitted plaintiffs to use 
either the consumer-expectation or the risk-utility test.69 
Advocates of strict-tort product-category liability have argued 
that the risk-utility test should be employed even where there was no 
alternative design that might have been adopted to avoid an inherent 
(and known) hazard associated with a type of product.70 Their posi-
tion is that if a reasonable manufacturer would not have marketed the 
product because the foreseeable harm from it outweighed the societal 
66. Despite this preclusion, the drafters included a comment specifically removing from the 
reach of strict liability "[u]navoidably unsafe products" whose known utility outweighed their 
risks, so long as the product in question was "properly prepared and marketed, and proper warn-
ing [was] given .... " /d., § 402A cmt. k. One might logically read into this a willingness on the 
part of the drafters to impose strict liability (or liability in negligence) upon the maker of an 
unavoidably unsafe product whose known risks outweighed its known utility. 
67. See W. Page Keeton, Products Liability-lnadeqiUlcy of Information, 48 TEx. L. REv. 
398, 404 (1970) 
([I]f the sale of the product under all the circumstances under which it was marketed 
subjected the consumer or others to an unreasonable risk of harm, the seller is subject 
to liability, and it is not relevant that he neither knew nor could have known nor ought 
to have known in the exercise of ordinary care that the unreasonable risk actually 
existed.); 
John W. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 15 (1965) ("assuming that the 
defendant had knowledge of the condition of the product, would he then have been acting un-
reasonably in placing it on the market?"). 
68. For the most influential exposition of the risk -utility balancing test for design defects, 
see John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 
(1973); see also Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 488 A.2d 516, 519 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) 
(applying Wade's test). 
69. See Ontai v. Straub Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 659 P.2d 734, 740 (Haw. 1983); Knitz v. Minster 
Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814, 819 (Ohio 1982). 
70. See, e.g., Bogus, supra note 7, at 30. 
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advantages it brought, defendant should be strictly liable for harm 
caused by the product. 
The use of strict tort in products liability suits removes from con-
sideration the issue of defendant's fault. The Restatement (Second) of 
Torts states that a seller may be liable even though he "has exercised 
all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product .... "71 The 
oft-reiterated mantra that the focus in strict tort is on the condition of 
the product rather than on the conduct of the manufacturer72 has un-
derscored the need for the jury to pass judgment upon the defective-
ness and the unreasonable danger of the product in question, and not 
upon the reasonableness of anything the manufacturer did or failed to 
do. 
Strict tort liability once helped plaintiffs by restricting affirmative 
defenses that defendants might assert because the Restatement recog-
nized only a limited form of assumption of risk that amounted to a 
form of contributory fault.73 The adoption of comparative negligence 
by courts as an affirmative defense in strict-tort products cases74 has 
reduced this advantage by permitting defendants to plead other forms 
of contributory fault in strict liability cases.75 
The rules of contribution as generally applied between a manu-
facturer subject to strict liability and a user who intentionally, reck-
lessly or negligently harms an innocent third-party, offer the 
manufacturer an avenue by which it can seek to lessen or shift its bur-
den of liability.76 
Strict tort, however, does require that plaintiffs establish that the 
product in question was defective, an element of the tort that proves 
71. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (2)(a) (1977). 
72. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 447 (Cal. 1978); see also Vargo, supra 
note 2, at 547-48. 
73. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS§ 402A, cmt. n (1977) ("the form of contribu-
tory negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known 
danger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this 
Section .... "). 
74. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1177 (Cal. 1978); Duncan v. 
Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414,423 (Tex. 1984). Contra, Bowling v. Heil Co., 511 N.E.2d 
373, 375 (Ohio 1987). See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 29, at 231-55. The proposed Restate-
ment of Products Li4bility would apportion damages where plaintiff failed to conform to an 
applicable standard Of care. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABIUTY § 12 (Pro-
posed Final Draft (Preliminary Version) 1996). 
75. However, plaintiffs gain by being able to seek a partial recovery in cases where they 
have unreasonably assumed risks. 
76. See, e.g., Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 374 N.E.2d 437 (Ill. 1977); 
Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., 434 N.E.2d 1008 (Mass. 1982). The possibility that the culpable user 
might be judgment-proof would hurt the manufacturer's chances to pass-off a portion of the 
liability. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
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problematical since in per se liability cases the products contain no 
flaws and are unavoidably unsafe.77 
C. Strict Activity Liability 
The rule of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities, as 
set out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, requires courts to con-
sider six factors in determining whether to impose liability without 
fault: (a) the seriousness of the harm threatened; (b) the degree of risk 
involved; (c) the possibility of reducing the risk by exercising due care; 
(d) the appropriateness of the activity to the surroundings in which it 
is carried on; (e) the extent to which the activity is commonly engaged 
in; and (f) the value of the activity to the particular community where 
it is located.78 The absence of any indication of how much weight 
these factors should carry, however, lends a high degree of indetermi-
nacy to this area of tort law.79 
If the decision to engage in extremely hazardous conduct is un-
reasonable, in that the activity's foreseeable risks outweigh its social 
utility to such a degree that a prudent person would not go ahead with 
it, persons injured by the activity may be able to recover in negli-
gence.80 Thus, the rule of strict liability is meant to apply only in cases 
where the initial decision to undertake the activity was reasonable.81 
But the factors governing the imposition of strict liability seem quite 
close to those used to determine whether an actor's conduct is 
negligent.82 
77. For a discussion of this impediment to strict-tort product-category liability, see infra 
notes 154-61 and accompanying text. 
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 520 (1977). 
79. For criticism of these factors as determinants of liability, see William K. Jones, Strict 
Liability for Hazardous Enterprise, 92 CoLUM. L. REv. 1705, 1707 (1992) (advocating rule of 
strict liability for harm caused by hazardous activity where injured party has no significant con-
trol of incidence or extent of harm). 
80. "If the utility of the activity does not justify the risk it creates, it may be negligence 
merely to carry it on, and the rule stated in this Section is not then necessary to subject the 
defendant to liability for harm resulting from it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 520 cmt. 
b (1977). 
81. The rule [of strict liability] ... is applicable to an activity that is carried on with all 
reasonable care, and that is of such utility that the risk which is involved in it cannot be 
regarded as so great or so unreasonable as to make it negligence merely to carry on the 
activity at all. ld. 
82. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 78, at 555 (strict liability and negligence factors are 
virtually the same, "except for the fact that it is the function of the court to apply the abnormally 
dangerous concept to the facts as found by the jury."). See also Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality of 
Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L. REv. 963, 970 (1981) stating: 
The Second Restatement, however, seeks to deprive this liability rule of much of its 
strictness by insisting that the appropriateness of the activity's location and 'the value 
of the activity to the community' -considerations seemingly bearing on the activity's 
reasonableness or negligence-weigh heavily in the rule's application. 
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In those situations where the decision to launch the activity and 
the conduct of the activity are reasonable but the activity might still 
qualify as abnormally dangerous, this rule of strict liability seeks to 
motivate those responsible for the activity to exercise both an appro-
priate degree of care and an appropriate level of activity, and to force 
them to bear the costs of accidents that nonetheless occur. In addi-
tion, the rule is consistent with a view of corrective justice which pos-
tulates that when a defendant generates risks to plaintiff of an order 
different from the risks plaintiff imposes on herself, defendant should 
be strictly liable in tort to plaintiff for harm attributable to those 
risks.83 
In order to apply this theory to the manufacturers of unavoidably 
and unreasonably risky products, plaintiffs have to convince the courts 
that the production of these commodities amounted to an abnormally 
dangerous activity because it made possible subsequent highly risky 
activity by users of the product. Harm from goods such as cigarettes 
and handguns results directly from their consumption or use, and only 
indirectly from their manufacture. 
D. Absolute Liability 
A fourth approach that has been suggested for product-category 
cases-absolute liability-falls within the theory of enterprise liabil-
ity.84 It rests upon the conviction that businesses should bear all the 
costs they generate, because they are in a superior position to reduce 
their costs to the most economically efficient level, and spread, 
through insurance and other mechanisms, those costs that are not 
worth avoiding.ss 
This theory would not restrict liability to costs incurred as a result 
of harm caused by abnormally dangerous activities or unreasonably 
and unavoidably dangerous aspects of products, but instead would 
force enterprises to internalize the costs of all damage they cause.86 
The cost spreading enterprise liability seeks to accomplish is consis-
83. See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REv. 537, 542 
(1972). 
84. On enterprise liability generally, see VIRGINIA E. NoLAN & EDMUND URSIN, UNDER· 
STANDING ENTERPRISE LIABIUTY: RETHINKING TORT REFORM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CEN-
TURY (1995). 
85. See Howard C. Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. Cow. L. REv. 
153, 175-94 (1976) (discussing the goals, criteria, and basic rationale of enterprise liability 
theory). 
86. For an elegant exposition of the case for enterprise liability in the products context, see 
Croley & Hanson, supra note 22. 
106 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:87 
tent with one of the justifications for strict-tort liability for defective 
products,87 and may also lie behind the rule of strict liability for ab-
normally dangerous activities.88 
II. THE POLICY DEBATE 
Three main policy arguments cut against the recognition of prod-
uct-category liability at common law: first, judicial decisions to impose 
such liability would lack political legitimacy; second, the judicial sys-
tem lacks the institutional competence to decide whether a type of 
product was so unreasonably and unavoidably dangerous that it never 
should have been marketed; and third, holding individual manufactur-
ers liable on a case-by-case basis is an unfair way to reduce the flow of 
unavoidably and unduly risky products. In addition, a separate policy 
argument stressing the radical and unworkable nature of absolute lia-
bility has been put forward against the use of that theory. 
This section will assess the strength of these arguments, and con-
sider whether negligence theory offers any advantages to plaintiffs 
seeking to recover for harm caused by unavoidably dangerous 
products. 
A. The Legitimacy of Product-Category Liability 
The illegitimacy of per se liability at common law stems from the 
contention that the banning of a product is essentially a political act, 
and only legislative action can achieve the sort of public consensus 
that should be reached before society takes an initiative of this na-
ture.89 Judgments about whether the choice to market a type of prod-
uct was reasonable require a weighing of societal risks and benefits, a 
responsibility that should be the exclusive province of the legislative 
branch. Moreover, the effect of per se liability infringes upon the au-
tonomy of large segments of the consuming public, and if such restric-
tions are deemed necessary, political institutions should impose them. 
87. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping with the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 
CAL. L. REV. 919, 933-34 (1981). 
88. See Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Revitalization of Hazardous Activity Strict 
Liability, 65 N.C. L. REv. 257, 275-86 (1987). 
89. See Grossman, supra note 6, at 405-07. 
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1. The Need for Public Consensus 
Legislatures may prohibit the sale of inherently dangerous prod-
ucts and provide sanctions for violations of a ban.90 Alternatively, a 
legislature might delegate to an administrative agency the authority to 
license potentially risky products before they are marketed,91 or to 
ban products already on the market and found to be dangerous.92 If 
lawmakers disagree with action taken by a regulatory agency, they 
have the authority to pass legislati<?n nullifying or modifying what the 
agency has done.93 
A lawsuit imposing product-category liability on an individual 
manufacturer would not, in and of itself, force a particular product off 
the market. Indeed, the jury's verdict would not bind juries in subse-
quent product-category lawsuits involving the same product, even in 
the same jurisdiction.94 For product-category liability at common law 
to amount to a product ban, a manufacturer would have to become 
convinced that different juries in different cases would conclude, with 
reasonable consistency, that products falling within a particular cate-
gory were unduly hazardous. Prudent manufacturers would then vol-
untarily cease producing the item and possibly take steps to recall it 
from the market (or even from consumers) to minimize potential 
liability. 
A series of verdicts for plaintiffs injured by one type of dangerous 
product might qualify as a public consensus that reflects the judgment 
90. See, e.g., Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (1994) (banning the manufac-
ture or distribution of drugs or other substances that have a high potential for abuse and no 
accepted, safe-medical use). 
91. See supra note 17. 
92. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(d), 333(a)(1), 334(a)(l), 335b(e) (1994) (providing for crimi-
nal sanction under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, for shipping in interstate commerce drugs 
banned and subject to seizure because they pose imminent hazards to their users.). 
Courts might invoke a legislative or administrative ban to justify a finding of liability against 
anyone who violated the ban and thereby caused harm to plaintiff. Under the doctrine of negli-
gence per se, the unexcused violation of a criminal statute or administrative regulation, in and of 
itself, amounts to negligent conduct. See CLARENCE MoRRis & C. RoBERT MoRRIS, JR., MoR-
RIS ON ToRTS 61-79 (1980); see also Hallway, supra note 43. 
For an example of a statute creating a civil remedy for plaintiffs injured by violations of 
rules that might include product bans, see Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2072(a), 
2061(a) (1994). 
93. See, e.g., Saccharin Study and Labeling Act, Pub. L. No. 95-203, 91 Stat. 1451 (1977) 
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 343(o)(1) (1994)) (preventing the FDA from finalizing regulations ban-
ning sale of saccharin as a food additive and providing warning label for products containing 
saccharin). On the saccharin episode generally, see Richard A. Merrill & Michael R. Taylor, 
Saccharin: A Case Study of Government Regulation of Environmental Carcinogens, 5 VA. J. NAT. 
REs. L. 1 (1985). 
94. Criticism directed at the episodic aspect of product-category will be discussed infra at 
Part II.C. 
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of the various juries' general communities. Moreover, if lawmakers 
determine that these verdicts are departing from the societal consen-
sus, they are free to enact legislation prohibiting the imposition of lia-
bility. In fact, this has already occurred in several instances.95 
Opponents of product-category liability claim this supports their posi-
tion.96 It is just as logical, if not more so, however, to view these de-
velopments as proof of the rational functioning of a system that allows 
the judicial process to play a role judging marketing decisions, subject 
to legislative nullification.97 
Legislatures are apt to inject themselves into controversies over 
widely used, highly dangerous products such as handguns and ciga-
rettes. On the other hand, in the case of less widely used products or 
products posing unreasonable but less extensive risks, legislative or 
regulatory attention cannot be assured. In these cases, lawmakers' 
and agency officials' decisions to act are discretionary in nature, and 
legislatures or agencies may simply decide that they have other, more 
important matters meriting their attention. Damage suits by victims 
thus serve as an alternative method of reviewing decisions to place 
these products on the market. 
Additionally, the public consensus reached by a legislature may 
in fact reflect the wishes of interest groups able to force their will 
upon lawmakers.98 Leaving room for product-category liability at 
95. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 9:2800.56(1) (West 1991), overruling Halphen v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986); N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-3(a) (1996), overruling O'Brien 
v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983). 
Legislatures might also issue "preemptive strikes" and ban certain types of product-category 
suits to prevent plaintiffs from bringing them. See, e.g., CAL CIV. CooE § 1714.4(a) (West 1983-
1984) (barring product-category recoveries based on findings that risks from guns or ammunition 
outweigh their benefits). 
On the other hand, legislatures might create statutory causes of action for product-category 
liability. For an example of a bill that would have created a federal remedy for victims in strict 
liability against manufacturers, importers and dealers of handguns and assault weapons, see H.R. 
661, 103d Cong., (1993) ("Gun Violence Economic Equity Act"). For a discussion of an Illinois 
statute imposing liability upon any drug trafficker in the jurisdiction for any damage caused by 
drug users, see Recent Legislation, 109 HARv. L. REv. 699, 699-750 (1996). 
96. See Grossman, supra note 6, at 395-97; Henderson & Twerski, supra note 6, at 1314-15. 
97. I have argued elsewhere that the decision in Kelley v. R. G. Indus., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 
1985), imposing product-category liability upon the manufacturers of handguns, provoked a leg-
islative reaction that on balance may have advanced the cause of public safety. See Joseph A. 
Page, Deforming Tort Reform, 78 GEo. L.J. 649, 688 n.198 (1990) (book review) (legislature 
"traded off'' rule in Kelley as part of compromise to obtain a gun-control Jaw). 
98. Potential third-party victims of dangerous products would have no way to identify them-
selves, and thus could not organize themselves and make their views known to legislators or 
administrators. For a discussion of the political influence likely to be influenced by potential 
victims, see Neil K. Komesar, Injuries and Institutions: Tort Reform, Tort Theory, and Beyond, 65 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 23 (1990). Users or consumers injured by risks of which they were unaware 
might, however, take part in legislative or administrative proceedings to ban the future sale of 
the product or to recall the product from the market. 
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common law permits ordinary people serving on juries to participate 
in the shaping of a societal judgment on the reasonableness of market-
ing inherently risky products.99 The quality of their participation de-
pends on the quality of the information presented to them by the 
attorneys trying the cases. It is arguable that the data committed ad-
vocates marshall on behalf of product-category liability in a tort suit 
may well be more effective than that mustered on behalf of product 
bans or removals in the legislative arena. 
Since jurors would be weighing the same factors in negligence as 
in strict tort for unreasonably dangerous products, and. the decision-
making process would be the same under both, neither theory would 
have an advantage over the other in rebutting the public-consensus 
argument. 
2. The Generality of Risk-Benefit Assessments in 
Product-Category Liability 
If courts were to recognize product-category liability either under 
negligence or strict liability theory, then juries would need to assess 
the overall risks a type of product created, and then compare those 
risks with what society would have lost if the items had never been 
marketed.100 The factors to be weighed by jurors would be quite gen-
eral in nature, especially when viewed against the very particularized 
risks and avoidance costs juries are asked to consider in ordinary neg-
ligence cases.101 Even in suits where plaintiffs claim that a defendant 
was unreasonable in deciding to engage in an activity,102 the activity in 
question usually is nonduplicative since it occurs within contexts that 
can vary considerably from case to case. Thus what might be unrea-
sonably dangerous in one environment might be reasonably safe in 
another.1o3 This keeps the extent of the danger created, and perhaps 
the amount of utility as well, within bounds easily comprehended by 
99. On the other hand, allowing consumers to decide whether or not to buy inherently risky 
products also permits public participation since goods that no one buys will not be marketed. 
This argument would not apply, however, to products whose dangers (or the full extent of whose 
dangers) were not known to buyers of products that put innocent third persons at risk. 
100. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text (negligence); see also supra notes 64-67 
and accompanying text (strict liability). 
101. Normally juries are asked to determine whether an individual act or omission for which 
defendant was responsible was reasonable or unreasonable. The risks created usually endanger 
a limited number of people, and the cost of avoidance usually focuses on the cost defendant 
would have incurred either by doing a single alternative act, or not doing the individual act that 
plaintiff claims was unreasonably dangerous. 
102. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text. 
103. The decision to use dynamite, for example, might be reasonable or unreasonable, de-
pending upon the location where the activity is to occur. 
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jurors.104 On the other hand, product categories are duplicative, in 
the sense that other manufacturers can market goods that fall within 
the same category and create the exact same risks and benefits. This 
complicates the jury's risk-utility balancing. 
Does this mean that only legislators, or administrators, may legiti-
mately make the judgment that a marketing decision produced unrea-
sonably dangerous results? 
To the contrary, judges at common law have the power to create 
duties binding the community at-large or broad classes of people 
within society.105 When they exercise this function, they may take into 
account any societal benefits and risks that flow from recognizing, or 
refusing to recognize, the obligation at issue.106 If courts decide to 
impose a duty, their authority to do so is beyond question.1o7 
Additionally, when a jury, acting pursuant to a court's recognition 
of a duty of due care in the making of marketing decisions, finds that a 
manufacturer acted unreasonably in distributing a particular type of 
product to consumers, or finds a manufacturer strictly liable in tort 
because a product category's risks outweighed its benefits, there 
seems to be no compelling reason to doubt the legitimacy of the ver-
dict as it affects the individual defendant.108 The same would be true 
if a number of different juries reached the same conclusion, and man-
ufacturers discontinued producing the particular items. 
Finally, the imposition of design liability traditionally has re-
quired the jury to weigh the risks arising from a particular design 
against the costs of using an alternative design-including any loss of 
utility that might result from the incorporation of the latter.109 Given 
104. The jury would be assessing both the utility and the risks generated by a single activity. 
105. For example, courts have imposed a duty of reasonable care on social hosts not to serve 
alcoholic beverages to minors or visibly intoxicated adults. See PAGE, supra note 28, § 12.21. 
106. For a recent example of judicial consideration of policy factors in deciding whether to 
impose liability on social hosts for negligently serving alcoholic beverages to minors, see Charles 
v. Seigfried, 61 N.E.2d 154, 156, 160 (Ill. 1995) (no duty). 
107. According to Professor Melvin Aron Eisenberg, courts derive their legitimacy in formu-
lating legal rules from their impartiality and the universality of the rules they establish. See 
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE CoMMON LAW 8-9 (1988). 
108. The jury would be expressing the community's judgment about whether the risks gener-
ated by a product category outweighed its utility. See Moning v. Alfono, 254 N.W.2d 759, 763 
(Mich. 1977). 
As Professor Eisenberg has noted, the "general community ... communicates with the 
courts in very direct fashion through the jury: one function the modem jury serves is to give the 
courts a reading on what social propositions are accepted by the community at large." EISEN-
BERG, supra note 107, at 13. 
Whether the judicial process is competent to make such determinations is a separate issue, 
to be discussed infra at Part II.B. 
109. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text (negligence), and supra notes 64-67 and 
accompanying text (strict liability). 
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the fact that design features are duplicative in nature, since every item 
falling within a particular product line incorporates them (and other 
manufacturers may replicate them), the factors juries balance in these 
cases contain a high degree of general applicability.no Decisions 
reached by these juries would likewise seem legitimate. 
3. Infringing Upon Autonomy 
Another objection to product-category liability is that it would 
unacceptably curtail the rights of consumers111 to satisfy their product 
preferences.112 Recognizing this form of liability, according to critics, 
would impose such staggering actual and potential costs upon manu-
facturers that they would have to remove the targeted products from 
the marketplace.l13 The implication here is if restrictions are to be 
placed on the cornucopia of goods from which a consumer might exer-
cise his freedom to choose, then they should be imposed by the pub-
lic's elected representatives, or by administrators acting under the 
authority delegated to them by the legislature. 
The personal autonomy said to be at stake here is a bedrock 
value that the common law traditionally has sought to preserve and 
promote.114 The freedom to make choices about how to exercise 
one's purchasing power serves as an important component of human 
dignity, us as well as an essential contributor to the proper functioning 
of a market economy. 
For these choices to be worth protecting, however, they have to 
be informed. This means that if consumers are incapable of under-
standing the existence and extent of unavoidable risks associated with 
a product, or are otherwise unaware of them, a cause of action for 
110. This is especially true when plaintiff claims that a product was negligently or defectively 
designed because it lacked a particular safety device. 
111. In this section the tertn "consumer" is used to connote a person who uses or consumes a 
product, whether she purchased the product or not. The freedom implicated here involves both 
the right to buy and the right to use or consume. 
112. See Grossman, supra note 6, at 405. 
113. See Henderson & 1\verski, supra note 6, at 1314. 
114. "With its elements of knowledge, appreciation, and choice, the classical assumption of 
risk defense is an expression of judicial belief in the values of individual freedom that were 
prevalent in the early common law." Note, Assumption of Risk and Strict Products Liability, 95 
HARv. L. REv. 872, 888 (1982) (citation omitted). 
The most notable example of the protection the common law extends to personal autonomy 
is its refusal to recognize a duty of reasonable care to aid a stranger in peril. See Heyman, supra 
note 28, at 676. 
115. The freedom to make choices extends beyond purchasers to individuals who have the 
opportunity to use or consume a product. Their freedom merits the same protection and promo-
tion. Hence, like treatment should be afforded both purchaser and nonpurchaser users or 
consumers. 
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product-category liability would not infringe upon their personal 
freedom.l16 
When consumers who are as cognizant of a product's inherent 
dangers as the manufacturer decide to buy it, they presumably engage 
in the same sort of balancing process that the manufacturer performed 
when deciding to market it. To the contrary, however, consumers bal-
ance on a personalized level, taking into account the risk and utility 
they expect from the product (rather than the societal utility and risk 
the manufacturer should calculate and compare). In situations where 
a reasonable manufacturer would not have marketed a product be-
cause its risks outweighed its utility, one of two conclusions may flow 
from a decision by consumers to consume: either the decision is un-
reasonable, just as the manufacturer's behavior in choosing to market 
the product category was unreasonable, or the benefits to the individ-
ual consumer outweigh the risks to her, so her option to consume is 
reasonable. 
Where consumers have deliberately expressed a positive prefer-
ence for known risks inherent in a product and suffer harm as a result, 
they have in a sense received what they asked for, since presumably 
the price they were willing to pay for the product included the value 
they assigned to the risk.117 It is difficult to understand why it would 
be fair to permit these consumers to recover damages.118 
Personal freedom to make risky consumption decisions and per-
sonal responsibility for the harm these decisions cause would seem to 
constitute two sides of the same coin. Product-category liability 
might, indeed, infringe upon personal autonomy if it permitted the 
injured party to recover under these circumstances. But an innocent 
third-party victim would stand in a different position, closer to that of 
the unwary consumer. The victim's freedom to enjoy physical security 
would have been infringed upon, without any corresponding personal 
gain inuring to the victim from the consumption of the dangerous 
product. 
The autonomy argument would therefore cut against product-cat-
egory liability only when a consumer, fully aware of the existence and 
severity of a product's inherent dangers, decided to expose herself to 
116. Indeed, it plausibly could be argued that the sale of a dangerous product interferes with 
the autonomy of unwary users or consumers by subjecting them to unreasonable risks of harm. 
117. See Note, Assumption of Risk and Strict Liability, supra note 114, at 875-82. 
118. For a detailed justification for denying plaintiffs recovery for harm caused by risks for 
which they have expressed a preference, see Kenneth W. Simons, Assumption of Risk and Con-
sent in the Law of Torts: A Theory of Full Preference, 67 B.U. L. REv. 213 (1987). 
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them. Imposing liability would act as a disincentive for manufacturers 
to permit the consumer to make this choice to the extent that it deters 
them from marketing unreasonably and inherently dangerous 
products. 
To what extent does the current state of the law either enhance or 
diminish individual freedom in the context of product-category liabil-
ity? Under existing negligence doctrine, if the consumer made a rea-
sonable choice to confront a product's unavoidable risks, she would 
not be able to recover for her damages if the jurisdiction recognized 
the defense of assumption of risk.119 In jurisdictions where assump-
tion of risk has been abolished, courts might conceivably rule that 
manufacturers have no duty to refrain from marketing inherently and 
unduly risky products for the benefit of plaintiffs who make reason-
able choices to use or consume them.12° Focus upon the duty element 
would permit courts to consider the enhancement of personal auton-
omy as a policy factor supporting a refusal to recognize a duty.121 
If the consumer made an unreasonable choice, she might be able 
to obtain a partial recovery in jurisdictions that recognized compara-
tive fault, 122 but would be barred from recovery in jurisdictions where 
the rule of contributory negligence still applied.123 Under strict tort 
doctrine, the reasonable plaintiff could recover in full, 124 while the un-
reasonable plaintiff would be barred from recovery12s-except in ju-
risdictions that recognized comparative fault as a partial defense.126 
119. See supra note 56 and accompanying text; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 68, at 
481. 
120. See Aaron D. 1\verski, Old Wine in a New Flask-Restructuring Assumption of Risk in 
the Products Liability Era, 60 IowA L. REv. 1, 27 (1974) (whether plaintiff aware of a product's 
risk and willing to encounter it should be permitted to recover is a "pure duty question"). 
On the treatment of plaintiff's reasonable assumption of risk as a function of defendant's 
duty or lack thereof, see generally Fleming James, Jr., Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarna-
tion, 78 YALE L.J. 185 (1968). 
121. Courts would have to weigh the value of personal autonomy against competing values, 
such as efficiency. The case for duty recognition as a means of enhancing efficiency would posit 
that the law should deter manufacturers from selling inherently and unreasonably dangerous 
products even to consumers aware of the risks. Because their risks outweigh their utility, society 
would on balance be better off if these products were not available to consumers. 
It is also conceivable that juries in product-category cases would consciously or uncon-
sciously factor into the risk-utility equation the social benefit of permitting individual consumers 
the right to make free and informed purchases of dangerous products. 
122. See supra note 55 and accompanying text; on comparative negligence generally, see 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 29. 
123. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
124. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
125. See 2 MADDEN, supra note 54, § 13.8, at 14. 
126. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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Thus, where the consumer acts reasonably, negligence doctrine 
will promote autonomy more than strict tort liability. Under the lat-
ter, the injured consumer will always be able to recover in full,127 
whereas under negligence doctrine, recovery may be denied.128 
Where consumers act unreasonably, negligence and strict tort lia-
bility would achieve identical results-denying liability in full or per-
mitting a partial recovery under comparative fault. 129 Conceivably a 
court in a comparative negligence jurisdiction might hold that, as a 
matter of law, manufacturers have no duty to exercise due care in 
marketing decisions for the benefit of consumers who make unreason-
able purchasing decisions in order to avoid the anomalous result of 
refusing to compensate plaintiffs where they have acted reasonably, 
but granting some recovery to plaintiffs who have acted 
unreasonably.130 
B. Institutional Competence 
A second policy argument stresses the incapacity of courts to en-
gage in the balancing of risks and utility necessary to support a finding 
of product-category liability.B1 This view posits that only legislatures, 
or administrative agencies acting under authority delegated to them 
by lawmakers, have the tools necessary to decide whether to ban a 
product. Referring to one particular type of product category, Profes-
sors Henderson and Twerski have written that, "[t]o be answered ra-
tionally, the question whether handguns of a particular size and 
monetary price are 'good for society' would require extended legisla-
tive or administrative hearings and investigations. "132 An additional 
advantage possessed by regulatory agencies is the expertise they pos-
sess and can bring to bear upon the judgments they render. 
127. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
128. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text. 
129. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text. 
130. The New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the defense of contribu-
tory negligence where a defendant was found to have breached a duty to protect a class of 
persons from their own inadvertence. See Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Co., 290 A.2d 281 (N.J. 1972). 
Although such inadvertence might have amounted to negligence on plaintiffs part, the Court 
held that he could recover under either negligence or strict tort liability. See id.; see also Suter v. 
San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A. 2d 140 (N.J. 1979) (Bexiga rule applied after adoption 
of comparative negligence in New Jersey). A similar argument based on policy and logic might 
support the denial of recovery by consumers who have unreasonably opted to expose themselves 
to known product risks. 
131. See Grossman, supra note 6, at 407-10. 
132. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 6, at 1306. For a reiteration of the institutional-in-
competence argument, see Toke, supra note 12, at 1202-05, 1208-10. 
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First of all, it is necessary to clarify what the institutional-compe-
tence argument does not say. The debate here should not be about 
whether legislatures and administrative agencies are more capable of 
making product-banning decisions than the courts, but rather whether 
courts are so incompetent to do this that the judicial process should 
totally exclude itself from any role in the reviewing of decisions to 
place products on the market. The fact that the legislative and admin-
istrative processes may be superior to the courts in their capacity to 
marshall facts and weigh competing considerations, a point which 
some have disputed, 133 does not mean that the capacity of the courts 
to do likewise is so weak that as a matter of general principle they 
should abstain from adjudicating product-category tort claims. 
The institutional-competence argument assumes that decisions · 
made by legislators and regulatory officials always will emerge from a 
dispassionate weighing of utility and risk. Yet legislatures are not re-
quired to engage in any sort of balancing before they decide to ban (or 
not to ban) a product, but are free to act on the basis of purely polit-
ical considerations.l34 Administrative agencies, moreover, may be 
vulnerable to pressures from the executive or legislative branches, and 
responsive to the wishes of interest groups with an extensive financial 
stake in the outcome of a regulatory proceeding.135 
The institutional-competence argument is in fact a revival of the 
criticism directed in the past at the balancing of risk and utility in 
product design cases, where jurors are asked to decide whether a man-
ufacturer should have used an alternative design in order to eliminate 
or reduce an unreasonable risk of harm posed by a product.l36 Under 
both negligence and the risk-utility test for strict liability in design 
cases, fact-finders must weigh the foreseeable risks associated with a 
133. See Bogus, supra note 7, at 65-85; see also Cornelius J. Peck, The Role of the Courts and 
Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. REv. 265 (1963). 
134. Under public-choice theory, which views the political process through the lens of eco-
nomic analysis, legislative decision-making can lead to arbitrary and discriminatory results, often 
yields outcomes that favor private interest groups, and bestows economic gain beyond that 
which the free market would produce. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: 
Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275, 283-95 
{1988); see also Jonathon R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory 
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 CowM. L. REv. 223, 227-33 (1986). 
Thus, public-choice theory might be applied by courts in support of product-category liabil-
ity, and against the view that risk-utility balancing with respect to decisions to market products 
should be the exclusive province of the legislature (or administrative agencies). 
135. See Bogus, supra note 7, at 76-85; see also Komesar, supra note 98. 
136. For the earliest and most extensive elaboration of the argument, see James A. Hender-
son, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudica-
tion, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 {1973); see also RICHARD EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCfS LIABIUTY 
LAw 84-88 {1980). 
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product as designed against the cost of avoiding those risks, the latter 
measured by the economic burden the manufacturer would have had 
to bear if an alternative design had been used, as well as any loss of 
utility the alternative design might impose upon the public.137 Critics 
have pointed to the difficulty, if not impossibility, in the context of 
litigation focusing on a particular aspect of a product's design, of tak-
ing into account the ripple effects an alternative design might 
generate.138 
Whatever the merits of this argument as it relates to design 
cases, 139 it generally does not apply to product-category liability, 
where jurors would not have to consider the technological and eco-
nomic feasibility of an alternative design, but rather the cost to society 
of being deprived of a particular product. This is not an issue that 
usually requires any degree of scientific expertise. A lay jury is per-
fectly capable of rendering a common-sense judgment on the social 
utility of products such as handguns, armor-piercing bullets, cigarettes, 
and exploding cigars.140 
As previously noted, manufacturers in negligence-based product-
category cases might assert the judicial-incompetence argument if 
they sought to persuade a court not to burden them with a duty, as a 
matter of law, to use reasonable care in the decision whether to mar-
ket a product.141 The judicial system's supposed incapacity to render 
such a judgment would constitute a policy reason for holding that the 
manufacturer's obligation to use due care applies only to the design, 
construction, and labeling of products, and not to marketing decisions. 
At the same time, courts deciding whether to limit a manufac-
turer's duty could consider appropriate policy reasons for imposing a 
legal obligation in product-category cases.142 These reasons would in-
137. On the risk-utility test for strict liability in design-defect cases, see John W. Wade, On 
the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973); see also Birn-
baum, supra note 2, at 649 (on the similarity of the risk-utility test to the test for negligent 
design). 
138. The difficulties created by the ripple effect, also known as polycentricity, provided the 
basis for the argument against design liability set out in Henderson, supra note 136. 
139. For a criticism of the validity of this criticism of design liability, see Ralph Nader et al., 
Automobile-Design Liability and Compliance with Federal Standards, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 
415, 431-34 (1996). 
140. For a case holding that jurors were capable of assessing the utility and risks of market-
ing slingshots to children, see Moning v. Alfono, 254 N.W.2d 759 (Mich. 1977). 
On the ability of lay juries to assess both the costs and the benefits of alcoholic beverages, 
see Cochran, supra note 19, at 316. 
141. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
142. For a discussion of the various policy factors that courts should weigh in deciding 
whether to impose a duty as a matter of law, see KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 53, at 359. 
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elude the desirability of creating incentives to force manufacturers to 
exercise due care when they decide whether to market a product, 143 
and the moral blame that the community might attach to marketing 
decisions that unleashed low-utility, high-risk products on the 
public.144 
In the strict liability context, the institutional-competence argu-
ment would have to serve as a reason for limiting strict liability to 
cases involving flawed products, or products rendered unreasonably 
dangerous because of the defendant's failure to adopt an economically 
and technologically feasible alternative design, the position taken in 
the new Restatement of Products Liability.145 The use of negligence 
theory in product-category cases may have a slight advantage for 
plaintiffs, because the existence of culpability on the part of manufac-
turers serves to offset the judicial-incompetence factor to the extent 
that a court might be willing to give it weight. 
C. Even Handedness in Product Banning 
Case-by-case adjudication of product-category cases means that 
plaintiffs will target individual manufacturers. Even though a number 
of companies may sell goods falling within a particular category, po-
tential liability will extend in a serendipitous way to the producer or 
producers who happen to be sued. Moreover, jury verdicts imposing 
or refusing to impose product-category liability may vary from juris-
diction to jurisdiction, and even within the same jurisdiction. Indeed, 
there is no guarantee that the same verdict will be reached in succes-
sive cases involving the same product made by the same 
manufacturer. 
A legislative or administrative ban, on the other hand, extends 
across the board to all manufacturers whose goods fall within a speci-
fied category, and will apply evenly to all affected products. Thus, the 
marketer of a product that has not yet injured anyone will receive the 
same treatment as the manufacturer whose products have inflicted 
harm. 
143. See id. The benefits and burdens that might accrue to society may bear upon the recog-
nition of a duty. Thus, a court should consider how much social gain, in terms of accident and 
injury prevention, the imposition of a legal obligation might bring about, and balance this against 
the social costs of imposing the obligation. If a net gain would result, the recognition of the duty 
would help prevent future harm that is worth preventing, which is one of the policies courts have 
sought to promote under the rubric of the duty issue. See id. 
144. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
145. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCfS LIABILITY §§ 1-2 (Proposed Final 
Draft (Preliminary Version) 1996). 
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It is difficult to imagine why product-category suits might be un-
fair because they single out manufacturers whose unavoidably danger-
ous products have caused injuries. First of all, in disposing of those 
claims, the courts will not be applying a novel principle of law. The 
notion of reasonableness has long implicated a balance of utility 
against risk.146 Hence, no element of surprise is present. In addition, 
an innocent victim has suffered harm because a manufacturer has ac-
ted unreasonably in placing a product in the stream of commerce, and 
the blameworthiness that attaches to such conduct would make it un-
fair to deny recovery to the plaintiff. 
Different juries may indeed come out with different verdicts 
when they assess a manufacturer's marketing decision, but this could 
reflect different values that individual communities place upon the 
utility of particular products. Rural jurors, for example, may view the 
sale of handguns more (or less) benignly than urban jurors. Thus, 
product-category tort suits may more accurately evoke relevant social 
attitudes toward unavoidably risky products than legislators or 
administrators. 
D. Absolute Liability As Unworkable And Radical 
Absolute liability means that a defendant is responsible for the 
consequences of her acts. This theory, when applied to manufactur-
ers, would permit plaintiffs to recover for any harm caused by a prod-
uct, whether defective or not, and whether unreasonably dangerous or 
not.147 
Absolute liability would raise difficult issues of causation and loss 
allocation. Suppliers of raw materials, designers, component-parts 
manufacturers, assemblers, those involved in the marketing process, 
distributors, transporters, retailers, installers, consumers, and users 
might all have done something to contribute to an injury inflicted by a 
product. It would be difficult to determine in a principled way at what 
point, if any, to exclude from responsibility parties who contributed to 
146. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 291(1) (1977) (acts deemed unreasona-
ble, and hence negligent, if risks outweigh utility). 
147. Professor Gary Schwartz refers to this as "genuine strict liability." See Gary T. 
Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. REv. 435,441 (1979). Profes-
sor Owen calls it '"ultra-strict' liability." See David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict 
Products Liability, 33 V AND. L. REv. 681, 714 (1980). Professors Croley and Hanson distinguish 
the terms "absolute liability" and "enterprise liability" by postulating that under the latter manu-
facturers cannot contractually relieve themselves of liability. See Croley & Hanson, supra note 
22, at 693-94. 
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the chain of events culminating in a product-related accident or 
illness.14S 
Another serious problem with absolute liability is that its adop-
tion would constitute a radical expansion of tort liability.149 Not only 
would the rule considerably broaden the ambit of harms for which 
manufacturers might be liable, but it might logically extend beyond 
products to damage caused by activities and conditions. Courts con-
sidering whether to impose this form of liability in a particular prod-
uct-category case would have to keep in mind that they would either 
be opening the way to the application of absolute liability to defend-
ants who engage in activities or maintain artificial conditions, 150 or 
they would have to justify limiting the doctrine to manufacturers and 
sellers of products.1s1 
Realistically, there is no possibility of securing judicial adoption 
of a rule of absolute liability in the near future. Although in theory 
courts have the authority to formulate such a rule, it does not yet com-
mand the degree of societal support to provide the undergirding for a 
148. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 6, at 1279-83. The authors also point out the 
difficulty in reconciling the notion of comparative fault with absolute liability, since the jury 
would have nothing with which to compare negligence on the part of the plaintiff. See id. at 1283-
84. However, the development of a theory of comparative causation might surmount this prob-
lem. Finally, the authors argue that absolute liability would make it difficult, if not impossible, 
for courts to place any limits on the manufacturer's responsibility for durable goods meant to last 
for many years. See id. at 1285-86. 
For criticism of the Henderson-Twerski critique of absolute liability, see Mark Geistfeld, 
Implementing Enterprise Liability: A Comment on Henderson and Twerski, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
1157 (1992); for a rebuttal, see James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, The Unworkability of 
Court-Made Enterprise Liability: A Reply to Geistfeld, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1174 (1992). 
149. A recent book advocating the judicial adoption of enterprise liability recognizes that 
courts would not only have to fashion broad new rules to define the scope of the liability of 
business enterprises, but they would also have to utilize the common law to place limits on 
recoverable damages. See NOLAN & URSIN, supra note 84, at 168-177. The determination of 
appropriate monetary caps on damages would seem to be a task for legislatures rather than 
courts, since it would necessitate compromise as well as periodic adjustment. 
Theoretical scholarship advocating absolute liability generally ignores the practical difficul-
ties of fashioning and implementing such a rule within the real-world constraints of the judicial 
and legislative processes. 
150. For arguments in favor of imposing strict tort liability on landlords, see Jean C. Love, 
Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence, or Strict Liability? 1975 
Wis. L. REv. 19. For arguments in favor of imposing strict tort liability on the possessors of 
business premises, see Edmund Ursin, Strict Liability for Defective Business Premises-One Step 
Beyond Rowland and Greenman, 22 UCLA L. REv. 820 (1975). 
151. Courts have not hesitated to subject the sellers and manufacturers of defective products 
to the expansive doctrine of strict tort liability, while at the same time they have refrained from 
extending the rule in other contexts. See, e.g., Hammontree v. Jenner, 97 Cal. Rptr. 739, 742 
(Ct. App. 1971) (driver subjected to sudden epileptic seizure, which could be categorized as a 
species of defect, held not liable to plaintiff injured when struck by out-of-control vehicle}; Pe-
terson v. Super. Ct. (Paribas), 899 P.2d 905, 906 (Cal. 1995) (holding neither residential landlords 
nor hotel proprietors strictly liable for harm caused by defect in leased premises). 
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completely new basis of tort liability.152 Indeed, the tendency of 
courts in recent years has been to cut back on the reach of tort liabil-
ity, or at the very least to reject attempts to expand it.153 
Negligence liability, therefore, offers a more promising way to 
deal with the immediate need to deter the introduction of unduly, in-
herently dangerous products into the stream of commerce, since 
judges are comfortable with the doctrine and there is widespread pub-
lic acceptance of the notion of blameworthiness as a basis for respon-
sibility. The development of a theory of absolute liability is a long-
range project that requires careful attention to how it would play out 
in the real world, and how to achieve the sort of societal consensus 
upon which judges might draw in fashioning a new liability rule. 
Ill. THE DOCTRINAL DEBATE 
Opponents and advocates of product-category liability have dis-
agreed about whether the theory fits within the parameters of strict-
tort products liability and strict tort liability for abnormally dangerous 
activities. The critics' position amounts to advocacy of a rule of no 
liability. This Section will explore the extent to which negligence doc-
trine might enable supporters of product-category liability to over-
come some specific objections that have been raised against using 
strict liability to impose it, and to mount a counterattack on a rule that 
would deny recovery to plaintiffs injured by unavoidably and unrea-
sonably dangerous products. 
152. Common law courts created the rules of negligence, as well as of strict liability for ab-
normally dangerous activities and defective products. But their exercise of the law-making func-
tion is not unlimited. As Melvin Aron Eisenberg has pointed out, courts establish and change 
the common law in accordance with certain basic principles, which include the necessity of root-
ing new rules in general standards followed by society as a whole; these standards may include 
moral norms, policies and customary practices. See EISENBERG, supra note 107, at 9, 14-42. 
153. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products 
Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REv. 479 (1990). 
Moreover, the current legislative climate has produced a wave of statutory limitations on 
both recovery and damages in tort law at the state level. For a compilation of state legislation, 
see American Tort Reform Association, Tort Reform Record (Dec. 31, 1996) (copy on file with 
the author). 
Courts may look to legislation as an embodiment of policies that reflect societal standards 
and hence ought to influence the direction of common law development. See EISENBERG, supra 
note 107, at 29-30. 
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A. Strict Products Liability vs. Negligence 
The field of strict-tort products liability, like ancient Gau1,1s4 is 
divided into three parts: claims involving manufacturing flaws, design 
flaws, and inadequate warnings or instructions-for-use.155 Products 
giving rise to per se liability claims do not contain any manufacturing 
flaws, are reasonably designed to achieve their intended purpose, and 
bear adequate warnings and instructions-for-use.156 Hence, they do 
not fit within any of the traditional categories. 
In and of itself, this should not necessarily protect the makers of 
unreasonably and unavoidably unsafe products from the threat of 
strict tort liability. The tripartite classification system has never been 
more than a factual construct. Elevating it to the status of a legal 
principle defining the exclusive reach of strict tort liability in products 
cases would represent a triumph of legerdemain over logic.157 
Opponents of product-category liability have sought to justify 
their position by asserting that the sine qua non of strict liability, as it 
has been applied in the three classes of products cases, is the existence 
of a defect in the product.158 Defects have been defined as either de-
partures from the manufacturer's own blueprint for the product;1s9 or 
as the failure to use an alternative design, warning, or instruction-for-
use that could have been employed at a reasonable cost and would 
have eliminated the unreasonable danger that caused the injury.160 
In product-category cases, the product is nondefective, since it 
contains no flaw, and since there is no alternative design, warning, or 
instruction-for-use that reasonably and feasibly could eliminate the 
154. See CAESAR, THE GALuc WAR 2 (T.E. Page et al. eds., Loeb Classical Library 1917) 
("Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres") ("All Gaul is divided into three parts") (author's 
trans.). 
155. On the tripartite categorization of products-liability cases, see KEETON ET AL., supra 
note 2, § 99, at 695-702. 
156. If they are obviously dangerous or they bear warnings about the hidden dangers they 
pose, they would be unreasonably dangerous upon a finding that their risks outweighed their 
utility. If the manufacturer gave no warning about a danger of which he was or should have 
been aware, and a reasonable manufacturer would not have marketed the product even to con-
sumers who had been fully warned, product-category liability might also be imposed. 
157. If this were to occur, it would not be the first time in tort law history that factual catego-
ries transformed themselves into exclusionist rules. For a critical account of the process by which 
the factual classification of invasion-of-privacy cases hardened into legal doctrine, see G. ED-
WARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 172-76 (1980). 
158. See Grossman, supra note 6, at 387-92; Henderson & 1\verski, supra note 6, at 1270-71; 
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LlABIUTY § 1 (Proposed Fmal Draft 
(Preliminary Version) 1996). 
159. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABIUTY § 2(a) (Proposed Final 
Draft (Preminary Version) 1996). 
160. See id. § 2(b )-(c). 
122 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:87 
danger. Therefore, according to the product-category contras, the 
strict tort remedy should not be available to the victims of these un-
avoidably unsafe products.161 Under this ratiocination, the fact that 
the utility of the product pales before the magnitude of the risks cre-
ated by it becomes totally irrelevant to the liability issue. 
Supporters of strict-tort per se liability, on the other hand, insist 
that the sine qua non of strict tort ought to be unreasonable danger, 
rather than defectiveness.162 Hence, products creating hazards that 
outweigh the benefits they generate would flunk the risk-utility test 
and thereby earn the designation of unreasonably dangerous, subject-
ing the manufacturer to strict tort liability. 
Reliance upon the absence of a defect to negate strict-tort prod-
uct-category liability overlooks the fact that in design, warning, or in-
struction-for-use cases the existence of a defect is established solely 
upon proof that the product as marketed was unreasonably danger-
ous. There is no "flaw" in the product, other than the undue danger 
that results from the manufacturer's failure to employ an alternative 
design, warning, or instruction-for-use. If, by definition, a product can 
be deemed "defective" in its design or labeling upon proof by plaintiff 
that the product as designed or labeled was unreasonably dangerous, 
conceptually it would seem logical to classify a decision to market a 
whole category of products as "defective" because of the manufac-
turer's failure to make an alternative marketing decision that would 
have withheld the product from consumers. The manufacturer's op-
tion to market would be evaluated in the same way as her option to 
use one of several alternative designs, warnings, or instructions-for-
use.I63 
Utilizing negligence theory in product-category cases would by-
pass the dispute over whether the existence of a defect is a prerequi-
site to liability because the courts have never burdened plaintiffs with 
the need to prove that a product is flawed in order to establish negli-
161. See Note, Handgruns and Products Liability, supra note 4, at 1912-20. 
162. See, e.g., Bogus, supra note 7, at 13-17; Wertheimer, supra note 12, at 1440-41. 
163. On the other hand, reliance upon unreasonable danger as the linchpin of strict products 
liability overlooks the fact that, where manufacturing defects are alleged, the courts generally do 
not force plaintiffs to prove both the existence of such defects and the fact that these flaws 
rendered the product unreasonably dangerous. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 99, at 695 
("A flaw that is created in the construction or marketing processes makes the product unreason-
ably dangerous as a matter of law since it causes the product to be more dangerous than it was 
designed to be."). Instead, courts either conclusively presume, sub silentio, that the flaws cre-
ated an undue risk, or they dispense altogether with the unreasonable-danger requirement. 
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gence on the part of a manufacturer.164 Since the focus in these cases 
is upon the conduct of the defendant, the standard for liability is what 
a reasonably prudent producer would have done in designing, manu-
facturing, and labeling the item in question. In a product-category 
case, the issue would be what a reasonably prudent producer would 
have done in making a final decision whether to market the 
commodity. 
The use of strict liability as the governing theory in product-cate-
gory cases avoids the need to convince jurors that the marketing of a 
reasonably designed, manufactured, and labeled product was unrea-
sonable. Even though the risk-utility factors to be weighed by the jury 
under strict liability and negligence might be virtually identical, would 
fact finders be much less likely to find that a marketing choice was 
negligent than to find that an inherently dangerous product was 
defective ?165 
If semantics pose a problem here, it seems plausible that jurors 
would have at least as difficult a time concluding that an unflawed 
product was defective as they would in determining that a marketing 
choice was negligent, which would nullify any advantage strict liability 
offers in this regard. Moreover, if jurors in product-liability suits 
against tobacco companies were willing to hold individual smokers 
personally responsible for choosing to smoke because of the known 
risks associated with cigarettes, 166 it is not farfetched to suggest that 
they might be willing to hold manufacturers responsible for choosing 
to market an unreasonably risky product, especially where plaintiff is 
either an innocent third-party victim or an unwary consumer. 
B. Strict Activity Liability vs. Negligence 
Attempts by plaintiffs to convince courts to hold handgun manu-
facturers strictly liable for engaging in an abnormally dangerous activ-
ity by marketing a highly hazardous commodity have been rejected in 
unequivocal terms that apply formalistic reasoning to underscore the 
inappropriateness of the theory in the products liability context.167 
164. See Oscar S. Gray, The Draft ALI Product Liability Proposals: Progress or Anachro-
nism?, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1105, 1112 (1994). 
165. I extend my appreciation to Professor Carl T. Bogus for urging me to confront this 
question. 
166. See Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. 
REv. 853. 871-76 (1992); Gary T. Schwartz, Tobacco Liability in the Courts, in SMOKING Poucy: 
LAw, PoLmcs, AND CuLTURE 131, 145 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen Sugarman eds., 1993). 
167. See, e.g., Martin v. Harrington and Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(interpreting Illinois law; making sale of product an activity would blur distinction between strict 
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Where the hazardous activity in question involves the use of a prod-
uct, the courts have been noticeably unreceptive to efforts to apply the 
theory to defendants other than those who actually utilized the prod-
uct in an abnormally dangerous way.168 This is not surprising since 
there has been a judicial reluctance to expand the parameters of the 
doctrine of strict-activity liability.t69 
Nonetheless, the existence of the doctrine does raise the question 
why the user of nondefective explosives may be strictly liable in tort to 
strangers injured in a blast that could not have been avoided by the 
exercise of due care, but the manufacturer of those same explosives 
would escape liability unless, as this Article argues, the decision to 
market the explosives in the first instance was unreasonable. The is-
sue may be sharpened by hypothesizing that the user, found to be 
strictly liable in tort, turns out to be judgment-proof. Why, then, 
should the manufacturer escape the reach of an identical rule of liabil-
ity without fault?t?o 
Strict-activity liability, as conceived by the Restatement, would 
not automatically apply to a person using explosives, but would flow 
from a judicial finding that the activity in question is abnormally dan-
gerous.171 This would require a close look at the circumstances of the 
particular blast. If the rule extended to the marketing, as well as the 
use of explosives, the factors utilized to determine abnormal danger 
would not necessarily lead to a finding of strict liability for the mar-
keter since the risk involved in manufacturing and selling explosives 
might not be of the same magnitude as an individual user's decision to 
set off a particular blast in a particular location. Therefore, subjecting 
both users and manufacturers to the same rule would not necessarily 
produce identical results since it would require the balancing of dispa-
rate factors. 
liability for sale of unreasonably dangerous products and strict liability for ultrahazardous activi-
ties); Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1255-56 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Louisiana law, 
liability for abnormally dangerous activity limited to activities that "originated in a landowner or 
custodian's use or abuse of land or immovable property in such a way as to cause injury to 
another person."); contra, Chapman Chern. Co. v. Taylor, 222 S.W.2d 820,827 (Ark. 1949) (pro-
duction of harmful pesticide held to be ultrahazardous activity). 
168. See, e.g., Cropper v. Rego Distrib. Ctr., 542 F. Supp. 1142, 1149 (D. Del. 1982) (manu-
facturer of anhydrous ammonia facility not strictly liable for engaging in abnormally dangerous 
activity because it did not operate facility); Hatfield v. Atlas Enter., 262 S.E.2d 900, 901 (S.C. 
1980) (manufacturer of fireworks not strictly liable for engaging in abnormally dangerous activ-
ity; it did not engage in discharging fireworks). 
169. See Schwartz, supra note 82, at 976 ("the ultrahazardous rule has stagnated in the 
courts"). 
170. I am indebted to my colleague Avery Katz for pressing this question on me. 
171. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 519, 520 (1977). 
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In addition, as has already been suggested, the Restatement's rule 
of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities involves the con-
sideration of elements that bring it quite close to negligence doc-
trine.172 If the sale of a nondefective, unavoidably hazardous product 
creates a high degree of risk and has no special value to either the 
general community or the particular community where the goods are 
produced, so that its marketing qualifies as an abnormally dangerous 
activity, it is difficult to imagine how the manufacture and sale of 
these same goods could be a reasonable activity. 
The argument might be made that strict liability should extend to 
any substantially hazardous commercial enterprise where the party 
engaging in the activity controls the risks.173 But this would be a step 
down the slope toward absolute liability for any harm caused by a 
defendant, a theory whose impracticability has already been 
suggested.174 
C. A Flat Bar on Product-Category Liability vs. Negligence 
If courts were to accept the proposition that strict tort liability 
does not encompass per se claims involving nondefective products, 
plaintiffs would have to try to classify their suits as claims either for 
defective design, inadequate warning, or instruction-for-use. Negli-
gence doctrine would obviate the need for this, since classification 
would be irrelevant. The focus of the inquiry in negligence would be 
on risk-utility balancing, which would incorporate allegations that a 
product should never have been marketed. 
Negligence theory thus avoids the difficulty of distinguishing be-
tween product-category cases and design-defect cases. This becomes 
critical if product-category liability is not recognized, since the classifi-
cation given to plaintiff's claim will determine whether it should be 
dismissed out-of-hand. 
In their criticism of product-category liability, Professors Hender-
son and Twerski demonstrated that the line is not an easy one to draw, 
especially where plaintiff argues that an alternative design should 
have been adopted and defendant insists that the claim, in fact, seeks 
to impose product-category liability; they presented the examples of 
suits against bicycle manufacturers based, on one hand, upon claims 
that the handle bars were too short and, on the other hand, based 
172. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
173. See Jones, supra note 79. 
174. See supra Part II.D. 
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upon assertions that defendant should have installed three wheels on 
its product.17S In both cases, the risk that caused the harm derived 
from the product's lack of stability. The authors pointed out that they 
relied upon intuition to classify the former case as one that "is not 
attacking the category 'bicycles' but rather a marginal variation within 
the category," while the latter is in the nature of "a categorical assault 
upon bicycles."176 
Hence, they would draw a line based upon "degree of sub-
stitutability."177 If plaintiff's position is that defendant should have 
adopted an alternative design that was a "relatively close substitute 
for the product as designed by the defendant,"178 the case would be 
classified as a design suit and thereby subject to risk-utility balancing. 
If what plaintiff calls for "is not a very close substitute,"179 the authors 
contended that the courts should not reach the merits of the claim, but 
should enter a judgment for defendant. 
What Professors Henderson and Twerski were attempting to do 
here was to prevent a plaintiff from circumventing a judicial refusal to 
recognize product-category liability. If there was in fact no conceiva-
ble substitute for the article in question, the case would clearly 
amount to an effort to impose per se liability. A fiat ban under this 
theory of recovery would mandate a dismissal of the claim. By sug-
gesting an alternative design, no matter how it might alter the identity 
of the product, plaintiff would remain within the parameters of strict-
tort product liability. 
Henderson and 1\verski purport to unmask certain types of de-
sign claims as product-category claims and hence subject them to sum-
mary dismissal. The line they suggest, based upon intuition and 
degree, seems somewhat inconsistent with positions previously taken 
by Professor Henderson in support of clear standards for decision-
making in tort cases.l80 The fact that the authors consider efforts to 
recover against distillers and cigarette manufactures for failure-to-
warn as per se liability claims in disguise181 suggests that they would 
be willing to permit trial judges to dismiss a wide variety of claims by 
175. See Henderson & 1\verski, supra note 6, at 1298-1300. 
176. !d. at 1299. 
177. !d. 
178. ld. 
179. !d. 
180. See James A. Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of 
Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976). 
181. See Henderson & 1\verski, supra note 6, at 1322-26. 
1996] LIABILITY FOR UNSAFE PRODUCTS 127 
using intuition and the malleable degree-of-substitutability test to tar 
them with the brush of product-category liability.182 
This approach to product-category liability thus seems to mask a 
different agenda, inasmuch as it permits the manipulation of the dis-
tinction between per se claims and claims based upon defects in design 
or warnings in order to facilitate dismissals of the latter. What is espe-
cially intriguing is that this tactic amounts to a mirror image of the 
ploy the Consumer Product Safety Commission used when it invoked 
the banning provision of the Hazardous Substances Act to set what 
were, in fact, design standards in order to circumvent the procedural 
obstacles Congress erected around the Commission's authority to pro-
mulgate design standards under the Consumer Product Safety Act.183 
In their hypothetical case of the two-versus-three-wheel bicycle, 
the critical question would seem to be whether the utility of producing 
two-wheelers instead of three-wheelers would outweigh the risks in-
herent in the two-wheeler. This issue would be at the center of a strict 
liability design case governed by the risk-utility test for defectiveness, 
as well as at the center of claims asserting negligent design and negli-
gence in the decision to market a two-wheel bicycle. 
The utilization of negligence theory in products cases would seem 
to bypass the roadblock that would result from the limitation of strict 
liability to situations in which the product in question created an un-
reasonable danger that could be eliminated by an alternative design or 
formulation. However, the latest version of the Restatement of Prod-
182. An example of how this might work may be imagined from litigation in which plaintiffs, 
who were injured while riding motorcycles when their bikes turned over and crushed their legs, 
brought suits alleging that their motorcycles were defective because they lacked crash bars or leg 
guards-pieces of looped metal tubing that protrude from the motorcycle between the rider's 
feet and the wheels, and keep the vehicle from falling on the rider's legs in the event of a turno-
ver accident. Under the Henderson-Twerski test, a judge might use his intuitive feeling that 
bikes with patent safety features like leg guards change the essence of motorcycle riding by 
reducing the risk factor at the heart of its appeal to devotees, and might classify the case as one 
of product-category liability, subject to summary dismissal. In other words, riding a motorcycle 
with leg guards is like riding a tricycle instead of a bicycle. 
Treating these cases as design suits, the courts have dismissed some of them and have let 
others go to the jury. Compare Hunt v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 248 S.E.2d 15, 17 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1978) (manufacturer has no duty as matter of law to install crash bars to protect motorcycle 
riders from obvious risks inherent in motorcycle riding); Satcher v. Honda Motor Co., 984 F.2d 
135 (5th Cir. 1993) (under Mississippi law motorcycle without leg guards not unreasonably dan-
gerous as matter of law because danger obvious to ordinary consumer); with Nicolodi v. Harley 
Davidson Motor Co., 370 So. 2d 68, 73 (Fla. App. 1979) (allegation that failure to install leg 
guards on motorcycle rendered vehicle unreasonably dangerous stated good cause of action). 
183. For example, the Commission used its banning authority under the Hazardous Sub-
stances Act to forbid the manufacture of refuse bins that did not comply with enumerated safety 
standards. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 1301.1-.8 (1996). For a discussion of this standard-setting technique, 
see Teresa Schwartz, The Consumer Product Safety Commission: A Flawed Product of the Con-
sumer Decade, 51 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 32, 68-69 (1982). 
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uct Liability may extend the roadblock, since it seeks to require that 
plaintiffs prove the existence of an alternative design even in negli-
gence cases, where the gist of the claim is that a product was defective 
at the time of sale or distribution.184 
CoNCLUSION 
Product-category liability seeks to hold manufacturers responsi-
ble for marketing decisions that should not have been made. Hence, 
negligence would seem to be the proper theory under which these 
kinds of cases should be brought. If a reasonable person would not 
have marketed a particular product line, the choice to do so bears the 
stigma of the type of blameworthiness that lies at the core of negli-
gence doctrine. · 
It may well be true that if recovery is denied to consumers aware 
of inherent risks posed by a product they freely purchase or use, the 
scope of product-category liability will be relatively modest, except 
insofar as it facilitates the possibility of suits against the manufacturers 
of handguns.185 Moreover, plaintiffs will find it tactically advanta-
geous to assert, wherever possible, that the defendant should have 
taken an alternative course of action, rather than simply refrain from 
marketing the product line in question. Under this approach, the loss 
of social utility that would have resulted if the defendant had taken 
the alternative course of conduct would be less than the actual loss of 
utility caused by what the defendant did, and hence the plaintiff would 
have a better chance of convincing the jury that the defendant acted 
unreasonably.186 
There still will be instances, however, where society would have 
been better off if defendant had refrained from putting a product on 
the market, and damage suits using negligence doctrine would usefully 
complement the legislative and administrative processes as mecha-
nisms to protect the public from the unavoidable hazards posed by 
these consumer goods. 
184. See RESTATEMENT {TmRD) OF TORTS: PRooucrs LIABILITY§ 2, cmt. n (Proposed Final 
Draft {Preliminary Version) 1996) ("The rules in this Section ... define the bases of tort liability 
for harm caused by product defects existing at time of sale or other distribution. . . . As long as 
these requisites are met, the traditional doctrinal [category] of negligence ... may be utilized in 
characterizing the claim."). For criticism of this limitation, see Gray, supra note 164, at 1109-13. 
On the other hand, if product-category claims are recognized as involving no allegation of a 
defect, the restriction in comment n would not apply. 
185. If cigarettes are proved to be addictive and tobacco-company officials knew or should 
have known of this fact, the dimensions of potential per se liability to be imposed upon the 
manufacturers will greatly expand. 
186. See 3 FowLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAw C>F ToRTS § 16.9, at 476 {2d ed. 1986). 
